May It Please the Court: A Longitudinal Study of Judicial Citation to Academic Legal Periodicals by Detweiler, Brian T.
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Law Librarian Journal Articles Law Librarian Scholarship 
10-16-2020 
May It Please the Court: A Longitudinal Study of Judicial Citation 
to Academic Legal Periodicals 
Brian T. Detweiler 
University at Buffalo School of Law, briandet@buffalo.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/law_librarian_articles 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Law Librarianship Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brian T. Detweiler, May It Please the Court: A Longitudinal Study of Judicial Citation to Academic Legal 
Periodicals, 39 Legal Ref. Servs. Q. 87 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/law_librarian_articles/51 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Librarian Scholarship at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Librarian Journal Articles by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please 
contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
May It Please the Court: A Longitudinal Study of Judicial 
Citation to Academic Legal Periodicals 
Brian T. Detweiler, Charles B. Sears Law Library, University at Buffalo 
School of Law, Buffalo, New York, USA 
*This is a draft, which was published in 39 Legal Reference Services Q. 87 
(2020) 
ABSTRACT 
This first part of this article examines the citation of American academic law 
journals in reported opinions from all U.S. state and federal courts from 1945-2018. 
The study shows a steady rise in the proportion of reported cases that cite at least 
one academic legal periodical from 1.8% in 1945 to a peak of 4.9%, first in 1967, and 
again in 1974 and 1975. Citation rates decreased from thereon, falling to a low of 
1.5% of reported cases from 2005-2010 before rebounding slightly in recent years. 
Part II of this article compares judicial citations from 1970-2018 for articles 
published in Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal, the two longest running 
student-edited journals1 at arguably the two most elite law schools in the United 
States,2 with articles published in flagship journals for each of the four "tiers" from 
the U.S. News & World Reports "Best Law Schools" rankings, and three exemplar 
schools from the "Top 14."  
This study shows that as the percentage of reported cases citing to at least one 
academic law journal article has decreased since the mid-1970s, so too has the 
proportion of reported cases citing to the leading journals of the elite law schools 
included in this study. At the same time, citation rates for law reviews of exemplar 
schools for Tiers I-IV remained relatively stable throughout. This paper attempts to 
explore and explain these trends in the context of changes in technology, the 
judiciary, legal scholarship, and academic legal publishing. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been nearly ten years since Chief Justice Roberts’s now famous quip at the 
expense of law reviews:  
 
1 Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of 
Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 779 (1985). 
2 See Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant: The Legal Education of the Justices from Holmes 
to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 129, 139–44 (2010) (exploring potential explanations for the 
confirmation of Harvard and Yale graduates, exclusively, for positions on the United States Supreme 
Court since 1986, and predicting that "the dominance of these two schools will most likely continue 
into the future, even if it is not quite as pronounced as it is in the present"). 
"Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is 
likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary 
approaches in Eighteenth Century Bulgaria or something, which I'm 
sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn't of much 
help to the bar."3  
While Chief Justice Roberts was hardly the first member of the judiciary to question 
the utility of law reviews,4 his stature stoked further discussion in a debate over 
their value that is as old as academic law reviews themselves.5 The Chief Justice's 
comments also coincided with the end of the five-year-long nadir for judicial citation 
of academic legal periodicals in this study, with the proportion of all reported 
opinions citing to law reviews having fallen steadily since their peak in the mid-
1970s.   
In addition to the overall proportion of opinions citing to academic law journals, this 
article examines the proportion of cases citing to the two longest running student-
edited academic legal periodicals, Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal with 
three exemplar schools from the "Top 14," and each of the four "tiers" of the U.S. 
News & World Reports "Best Law Schools" rankings. The findings in this study 
suggest that the citation advantage enjoyed by Harvard, Yale, and other "elite" law 
schools has also decreased since the 1970s while citation rates to journals from law 
schools in Tiers I-IV of the rankings have remained consistent.  
This article will begin with a brief look at the history of student-edited law reviews 
in the United States and how their initially cool reception gradually gave way to 
acceptance by the judiciary. This study begins in 1945 and explores the gradual 
increase in the proportion of opinions citing law reviews that would reach its zenith 
in the 1960s and 70s, followed by a steady decline thereafter. I believe this trend 
can be explained, in large part, by an increase in both judicial caseload and the 
number of opinions, changes in technology that facilitated research and access to 
those opinions, and changes in scholarship that made law reviews seem less 
relevant to the bench and bar.  
 
3 John Roberts, A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts (30:42–32:14). In addition to stirring 
debate, Chief Justice Roberts's remarks prompted publication of a tongue in cheek article about his 
hypothetical topic: Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 
Eighteenth Century Bulgaria, 18 THE GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015). 
4 See, e.g., infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.   
5 See Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 764–66 (quoting The Albany Law School Journal, 3 CENT. 
L.J. 136 (1876)) (noting the cool reception received by the first student-edited legal periodical at the 
hands of commercial journal editorial boards: "'The boys at the Albany Law School have had the 
enterprise to start a new journal,' wrote the Central Law Journal on February 25, 1876, adding, 
'Altogether it is quite creditable. Of course it is not a man's journal.'").   
Part II of this article begins by comparing citations to flagship journals from 
Harvard and Yale with those of other law schools representing the "Top 14" and 
each of the four tiers of the U.S. News Rankings. The data shows a significant 
decline in citation to the elite law schools’ law reviews since the 1970s, but a 
persistent bias in favor of these journals remains. The article explores these 
changes in citation frequency in the context of continued elitism in the legal 
profession and amid changes in technology and legal publishing that have narrowed 
these discrepancies.  
PART I: CITATION OF ACADEMIC LAW REVIEWS BY THE JUDICIARY 
EARLY LAW REVIEWS 
By the late Nineteenth Century, legal periodicals had become an important part of 
American legal publishing, allowing lawyers to monitor recent opinions and keep 
abreast of changes in the law.6 Until the launch of the Albany Law School Journal 
in 1875, these efforts were entirely in the hands of professional editors.7 This 
journal, and another started by law students at Columbia were short-lived, but they 
laid the groundwork for students at Harvard Law School to follow in their footsteps 
by founding the Harvard Law Review in 1887.8 Four years later, their peers in New 
Haven launched the Yale Law Journal, followed by the establishment of law 
reviews at Pennsylvania, Columbia, and Michigan.9 Perhaps not coincidentally, 
 
6 Roger C. Cramton, The Most Remarkable Institution: The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
1, 2 (1986). See also Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 751–63 (describing the development of 
commercial legal periodicals in the United States) and FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND 
METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 215 (3d ed. 1942) (quoting Charles E. Grinnell, General Notes, 15 AM. 
L. REV. 806 (1881)) ("By 1881, writers began to speak of our periodical law press as 'now fast 
developing into a valuable substitute for a national system of law.'"). 
7 See Michael I. Swygert, Imitating the 'Boys' of Albany: The Birth of the Valparaiso University Law 
Review, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 157, 158-–60 (discussing responses to the early student-edited journals at 
Albany and Columbia) (1991); see also HICKS, supra note 6, at 207 (listing publication date ranges for 
early law school periodicals). For a description of a surviving issue of the Albany Law School 
Journal, see Robert A. Emery, The Albany Law School Journal: The Only Surviving Copy, 89 L. 
LIBR. J. 463, 464-65 (1997) (noting its content more closely resembles a student newspaper than an 
academic law review). 
8 Cramton, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 768–69 ("Although there 
is no evidence that [the] Harvard editors were aware of the earliest student-edited periodical, the 
Albany Law School Journal, they certainly were familiar with the Columbia Jurist . . . [and their] 
knowledge of the Columbia students' venture in legal journalism surely contributed to the overall 
concept of the Harvard publication."). 
9 Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 782–84 (noting also that law reviews at both Michigan and 
Northwestern were initially edited by faculty). 
these longest-running academic journals are associated with many of today’s elite 
law schools.10 
FIRST CITATIONS IN CASE LAW   
While law reviews may have found avid readership among their alumni and utility 
to members of the profession,11 judicial citation of journals was exceedingly rare 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.12 The earliest instance of 
a substantive citation to a legal periodical, rather than simply citing a case reported 
in a journal, came from an 1857 Supreme Court of Indiana case.13 In reaching their 
conclusion that a municipality had authority to purchase stocks in a railroad that 
ran through the city, the Court cited to the lead article from an 1854 issue of the 
American Law Register that argued in favor of state sovereignty over its navigable 
waterways, and in turn, the delegation of that legislative authority to its 
municipalities.14 
Since the American Law Register was professionally edited at the time, not being 
published by the University of Pennsylvania Law School until 1896,15 I investigated 
further and found what I believe to be the first citation to a student-edited legal 
periodical in American case law, an 1890 North Carolina Supreme Court opinion in 
which the judge refers to a Harvard Law Review article by Christopher Columbus 
 
10 See, e.g., 2021 Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://www.usnews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited July 7, 2020) (each of these law schools 
falls within the "Top 10" of the most recent rankings) and Lowell J. Noteboom & Timothy B. Walker, 
The Law Review—Is It Meeting the Needs of the Legal Profession?, 44 DENV. L.J. 426, 447 (1967) 
("[T]he law reviews at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Pennsylvania, etc. have been around for a long time, 
and they are associated with law schools that established themselves early as excellent institutions 
in the field of legal education. It is primarily because they were the first in the field to do a good job 
(or any job at all) that they initially rose to positions of leadership."). 
11 See e.g., Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 773 (noting the first issue of the Harvard Law Review 
had around 300 subscribers, and that by 1890, the Harvard Law Association began purchasing 
copies for all of its members). By the turn of the century, heavy demand for early copies of the 
Review necessitated an extensive reprinting effort. Id. at 779 (citing 15 HARV. L. REV. 219 (1901)). 
12 See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. 
L. REV. 773, 811 (finding percentage of state supreme courts citing to law reviews remained between 
0.3 and 0.5 percent from 1870 through 1925). 
13 City of Aurora v. West and Another, 9 Ind. 74, 1857 Ind. LEXIS 482 (1857). 
14 Id. at 82 (citing Are State Bridges Constitutional?, 3 AMER. L. REGISTER 1 (1854)). The article was 
not quoted in the opinion, but states, "if Pennsylvania cannot affect the destination of the Schuylkill, 
because goods are carried on it to other states, a fortiori it cannot control the employment of the 
streets of Philadelphia . . . over which a commerce to other States of immensely greater value, daily 
passes; nor can it authorize the city corporation to make municipal regulations for that purpose . . . If 
the argument be correct, indeed, nothing is left in the states to legislate over." Id. at 24.  
15 Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 756. The American Law Register, was renamed the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review in 1896, and has the distinction of being "the oldest continually published 
legal periodical in America." Id. at 781. 
Langdell to explain a concept that was "so familiar . . . [it was] hardly necessary to 
illustrate [it] by reference to actual cases."16  
The U.S. Supreme Court, meanwhile, would not cite to a student-edited journal 
until Justice Edward White's dissent in an 1897 contracts case, United States v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,17 followed three years later by the Court’s first law 
review citation in a majority opinion.18 Even then, law reviews were not widely 
accepted, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would dismiss them as the "work of 
boys" a decade later, when an attorney referred to them during oral argument.19 As 
late as the 1920s, Chief Justice William Howard Taft "chided his colleagues 
(principally Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone) for the 'undignified' use of law review 
material in their dissents."20  
ACCEPTANCE AND APPROBATION 
By then however, the sentiments of the judiciary had already begun to change, led 
by luminaries like Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, and Judge Learned Hand,21 
 
16 Hancock et al. v. Wooten et al., 12 S.E. 199, 201, 107 N.C. 9, 20 (1890) (citing C.C. Langdell, A 
Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction: Creditors' Bills, 3 HARV. L. REV. 99 (1890)) ("Bills of this kind are 
called 'Judgment Creditors' Bills' (see Harvard Law Review, October 1890), and are so familiar in 
our practice that it is hardly necessary to illustrate them by reference to actual cases."). 
17 Swygert & Bruce, supra note 1, at 788 (citing U.S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 350 
n.1 (1897)). 
18 Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History of the Law Review Institution, 30 AKRON L. 
REV. 15, 26 (1996) (citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 178 U.S. 353, 365 (1900)). In a 
unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Melville Fuller cited a discussion on partial payment in 
satisfaction of a debt appearing in an 1899 Harvard Law Review article. Id. (citing James Barr 
Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515, 521 (1899)). 
19 Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1941). Interestingly, despite his later 
criticism, Holmes authored the lead articles in two issues of the Harvard Law Review several years 
prior: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891) and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894); see also Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law 
Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 9–
10, 15 (1983) (finding only one citation to a law review during the October 1900 Supreme Court Term 
and concluding, "it obviously was not considered acceptable for Supreme Court Justices to refer to 
[legal periodicals] at the turn of the century."). 
20 JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE DIMENSIONS OF NON-LEGAL EVIDENCE IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS 
133 (1990) (quoting ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 268-69 (1965)). See also Chester A. 
Newland, supra note 20, at 479 (in a study of Supreme Court opinions from the October Term of 
1924 through the October Term of 1956, Chief Justice Taft cited a legal periodical only once, and 
Justice Holmes only twice; Brandeis, and Stone were both more apt to cite law reviews, citing them 
19 and 21 times, respectively, during that period).  
21 See id.; see also Douglas B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to 
the Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 186 n.11a (1930) (quoting Circuit Judge Learned 
Hand, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, and Chief 
Justice Robert von Moschzisker of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the usefulness of law reviews 
in the performance of their judicial duties and their willingness to cite them in their opinions) and 
Frederick E. Crane, Law School Reviews and the Courts, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (1935) (Chief Judge 
 
although the proportion of opinions citing to law reviews around this time still 
remained well below their lowest point in this study.22 In 1941, Taft's successor, 
Chief Justice Charles Hughes, struck a far more positive tone in a foreword 
composed in honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Yale Law Journal, where he 
described law reviews as the "fourth estate of the law" and said, "[i]t is not too much 
to say that, in confronting any serious problem, a wide-awake and careful judge will 
at once look to see if that subject has been discussed, or the authorities collated and 
analyzed, in a good legal periodical."23  
METHODOLOGY 
To determine the total number of opinions in Lexis for a given year, I ran a search 
for that year in Lexis Advance's "Cases" database and restricted my results by date 
to that year alone. For example, by searching ("1972") & DA(aft 12-31-1971 & bef 
01-01-1973), and selecting "Publication Status" from the menu on the left, I found 
59,320 reported opinions for 1972. I could then add the reported and unreported 
numbers together to determine the total number of opinions in Lexis for that year, 
in this case 60,758; however, I assumed researchers would be most interested in 
seeing how journals were cited in reported opinions, so I focused my data gathering 
efforts on those results.24    
In the interests of readability, the searching and data compilation methodologies I 
employed for Part I are included as Appendix A. That section recounts my attempt 
 
Crane of the New York Court of Appeals wrote in a symposium piece for Fordham Law Review, "[law 
reviews have] supplemented the textbook and the decision because we have found from experience 
that the modern law professor . . . has had time as well as desire to enter thoroughly into the study 
of a particular subject and has given the result of his efforts for the benefit of the profession . . . we of 
the bench, as well as the lawyer at the bar, should make this acknowledgement, though somewhat 
belated, of the help which we get from [law reviews] in the disposition of the every-day work of the 
courts."). 
22 Douglas B. Maggs, supra note 21, at 191–94 (examining federal and state reported opinions from a 
roughly one year period in the late 1920s and U.S. Supreme Court opinions from 1924-1928, and 
finding only 80 opinions out of an estimated total of 30,000 [0.27%], and 61 out of approximately 850 
judges citing law reviews.) Another study of state supreme courts found the percentage of opinions 
citing to law reviews remained between 0.3% and 0.5% between 1870-1925 before increasing to 2.3% 
from 1930-40, 3.8% from 1945-55, and finally 11.9% from 1960-70, with the "innovative" supreme 
courts from New Jersey and California leading the way. Friedman et al., supra note 12 at 811, 815.  
23 Hughes, supra note 19, at 737. This change at the U.S. Supreme Court was initially led by Justice 
Louis Brandeis, and solidified by the nine Justices appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Closen & Dzielak, supra note 18 at 27 (citing PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE 
PEOPLE 364 (1984)). 
24 See David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of 
Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1353–54. ("Reported decisions are 
documents evidencing the law, and thus citation to legal scholarship in reported decisions brings 
cited scholarship into close relationship with the law."). 
to include all academic journals listed in the Current Index to Legal Periodicals,25 
the Index to Legal Periodicals Retrospective: 1908-1981 Coverage List,26 and the 19th 
edition of The Bluebook.27  
A RISING TIDE 
During the first year of my study in 1945, academic law reviews were still only cited 
in roughly 1.8% of opinions, but the period following World War II would usher in 
an era of growth, both in their numbers28 and in their citation by the judiciary, as 
this "remarkable institution"29 "earned the real respect of the bench."30 By the early 
1960s, the proportion of cases citing law reviews had increased to nearly four 
percent of reported opinions. Judge Roger Traynor said at that time, "There is in no 
other profession and in no other country anything equal to the student-edited 
American law review," describing law reviews as "the best critics a judge could 
have."31  
The ensuing years, from 1963 through 1980, witnessed a high-water mark in the 
judicial citation of academic law reviews in this study, with the proportion of 
opinions citing journals never falling below 4%, and reaching as high as 4.9% in 
1967, 1974, and 1975. This peak represents a 172% increase in opinions citing law 
reviews since 1945.  
The years following the 1975 peak witnessed a slow and steady decline in the 
proportion of opinions citing to law reviews in my study as citations fell below 4% by 
1981, below 3% in 1987, and below 2% in 1994, falling to their lowest proportion in 
 
25 CILP Journals, HEINONLINE, https://libguides.heinonline.org/c.php?g=1045270&p=7595542 
[https://perma.cc/V2B3-T2FA] (last visited July 6, 2020). 
26 Index to Legal Periodicals Retrospective: 1908-1981 (H.W. Wilson) 
Database Coverage List, EBSCO, https://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/lpr-coverage.htm 
[https://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/lpr-coverage.htm] (last visited July 6, 2020). 
27 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 
2010). This was the last edition to include a list of periodicals by title in Table 13. 
28 Barbara H. Cane, The Role of Law Reviews in Legal Education, The Role of Law Review in Legal 
Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215, 220 (1981) (noting an increase in the number of law reviews from 
44 in 1941 to 78 in 1955, 102 in 1966, and 182 in 1979). 
29 Earl Warren, Messages of Greeting to the U.C.L.A. Law Review, 1 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1953). 
30 Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 918 (1953) ("We admire 
the law review for its scholarship, its accuracy, and, above all, for its excruciating fairness. We are 
well aware that the review takes very seriously its role as judge of judges—and to that, we say, more 
power to you.").  
31 Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REV. 3, 8-–10 (1962); see also 
William O. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1965) (in an address 
delivered to members of the Washington Law Review, Justice Douglas relayed his "special affection 
for law reviews . . . [noting he has] drawn heavily from them for ideas and guidance as practitioner, 
as teacher, and as judge") and Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 433 (noting that 62.7% of 
judges who responded to a 1966 survey found law reviews "quite valuable" for their research versus 
16.7% who felt they had "little or no value"). 
2009, at 1.47%. This figure represents a 70% decrease from the mid-1970s. The 
proportion of opinions citing to law reviews has risen slightly since, however, 
coming back full circle to reach 1.8% in 2018, the same percentage as in 1945, the 
first year of this study. Other studies have shown similar patterns in judicial 
citation of legal scholarship at different points during this time period.32 
 
32 See, e.g., Friedman et al., supra note 12 at 811; John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: 
An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 
1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 405 (1978) (noting an increase in citations to legal periodicals by the 
California Supreme Court from 87 in 1950 to 164 in 1970); Michael D. McClintock, The Declining 
Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998) (in a study of 
citations to 40 leading law reviews by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, federal district 
courts, and state supreme courts, the author found quantitative decreases of 58.6%, 56.0%, 24.8%, 
and 46.8%, respectively, between the years 1975-1976 and 1995-1996); Louis J. Sirico Jr., The Citing 
of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1011–13 (2000) (finding "a 
steady decline" in both the number and proportion of opinions  citing to legal scholarship over four 
different two-year Supreme Court terms between 1971 and 1998); and Blake Rohrbacher, Decline: 
Twenty-Five Years of Student Scholarship in Judicial Opinions, 80 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 553 (2006) 
("Judicial citation of student notes has plunged since 1980."). Cf. Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra 
note 12, at 1363 (authors noted a steady increase in the proportion of opinions citing to legal 
scholarship from 1950, reaching a high point in in the late 1970s through the early to mid-1980s, 
followed by a steady decrease through the remainder of the decade before the proportion leveled out 
around 1990 and "[held] steady at a rate substantially higher than in the earlier years studied."). 
But see Whit D. Pierce & Anne E. Reuben, Empirical Study, The Law Review is Dead; Long Live the 
Law Review: A Closer Look at the Declining Use of Legal Scholarship, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 
1203, 1221–25 (2010) (in a study limited to federal and state court opinions that included headnotes 
on Westlaw, two Wake Forest law students found proportional increases in the judicial citation of 
law reviews between the years 1960-1964 and 2005-2009, finding the largest increase among U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions, from 12.9% to 31.4%).  
 
The overall quantity of opinions citing to law reviews also increased from the 
beginning of this study, ultimately reaching its peak of 4,226 in 1983, somewhat 
later than the proportional peak because the number of reported opinions over that 
time—115,192 for 1983 versus 71,112 in 1975—outpaced the growth of citations, 
meaning that the proportion had decreased by 1983 to 3.7%. As with the 
proportional percentage, the quantity of opinions citing to law reviews also declined 
fairly consistently after its peak over the ensuing decades.33  
 
 
33 See Figure __, "Number of Reported Opinions Citing Law Reviews"; see also McClintock, supra 
note 32, at 689 (showing a decline in citations to 40 leading law reviews by all federal courts and 
state supreme courts from 7,131 in 1975-76 to 6,835 in 1985-86, and finally, 4,108 in 1995-96). 
 
THE TIDE EBBS 
There are several potential explanations for why, after years of growing acceptance 
and utilization as a source of reference for the courts, law reviews began to fall out 
of favor. These factors include changes in technology, increases in caseload and case 
law, and a shift in the legal academy led by the elite law schools that pushed the 
boundaries of scholarship beyond the scope of matters typically litigated in the 
courts. 
TECHNOLOGY 
From the 1940s through the 1980s, researchers hoping to find law review articles on 
a particular topic would typically need to consult a periodical index such as Index to 
Legal Periodicals before pulling a physical journal volume from the shelf.34 This 
process began to change in 1982, when Lexis and Westlaw added the text of select 
law reviews to their searchable databases; 35 however, the inclusion of additional 
 
34 See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 336–37 (3d ed. 1942); see 
also J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 314 (1977) 
("[T]he usefulness of legal periodicals depends almost entirely on the ability to find out what articles 
have been written and where they have been published. Generally, it is necessary to rely to indexes 
to the legal periodical literature for this purpose."). 
35 Howard A. Hood, Disk and Dat: Recent Developments in Legal Databases and Emerging 
Information Technologies in the United States, 15 INT'L J. L. INFO. 109, 112 (1987) ("LEXIS has 
added all articles from over thirty journals beginning with their 1982 volume. WESTLAW has 
selected articles from many more journals for the same period . . . [although] [b]ecause of the 
 
titles was a gradual process,36 and researchers relied primarily on indexes into the 
1990s.37 
At the same time, the ease of locating caselaw through Lexis and Westlaw, 
introduced in 1973 and 1975, respectively, likely had an ever-greater impact on the 
decline of journal citation of law reviews as these now ubiquitous databases became 
increasingly relied upon by the legal profession.38 By facilitating the discovery of 
primary law, these services provided researchers with a viable, and in many ways 
superior alternative to using law reviews as a shortcut for their own research.39 
 
selectivity of the WESTLAW database, one cannot be sure whether a particular article will be 
available through that service. (West has recently decided to match [Lexis] in loading all articles 
from the top legal journals.)"). 
36 By the late 1980s, Lexis provided full-text searching of roughly 48 mostly academic law reviews it 
considered "important," while Westlaw provided access to a broader range of journals, although some 
with coverage of individual articles only, selected for their importance to legal practice. MORRIS L. 
COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 376–77 (9th ed. 1989); see also Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last 
Writes—Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 657–58 (1996) 
(explaining the reasons for the initial exclusion of law reviews, and beginning in 1982, the gradual 
inclusion of full-text journals into the databases). 
37 See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 926, 937 (1990) ("Finding everything that's ever been written on [a] subject requires little more 
than leafing through the Current Law Index or its older but perfectly adequate counterpart, the 
Index to Legal Periodicals.") By the mid-1990s this seems to have changed. See Hibbitts, supra note 
36, at 658–59 ("Together, LEXIS and WESTLAW have subtly changed the way in which law review 
material is distributed, accessed, and employed by many members of the American legal 
community."). 
38 See William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAW LIBR. J. 
543, 547–53 (1985) (discussing the Ohio Bar Association's attempt to create an "on-line" legal 
research service that would eventually evolve into Lexis, and the West Publishing Company's 
subsequent development of Westlaw in response); see also Peter Nycum, Law and Computers: 
Overview Update 1975, 68 LAW LIBR. J. 234, 247–49 (reviewing databases available, and expected to 
be made available, to Lexis subscribers by the end of 1975; Lexis offered two subscription plans for 
access to a single terminal, a $36,000 per year plan that provided between 28 and 55 hours of 
research per month, and a second option for $18,000 per year that provided 9–18 hours of search 
time per month). At the time the article was published, the West Retrieval System, which would 
begin by offering electronic access to West's General Digest, Fourth Series, was still in testing. Id. at 
250. 
39 Pierce & Reuben, supra note 32, at 1194 ("[W]ith the emergence of the Internet, judges and their 
clerks have easy, instant access to reams of caselaw. It used to be that law reviews serve as an easy 
research tool for judges. A judge before he or she wrote an opinion, would use a law review to do just 
that—review the law. With the advent of the Internet, it makes sense for a judge to cut the 
middleman out of the research process."); see also, Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic 
Legal Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 319 (1989) (Judge Kaye notes reading law reviews for 
background information in relation to the issues she faces on the New York Court of Appeals, but 
"do[es] not seek out law review articles for case compilations—we have a variety of manual and 
computerized research tools for such information."). See also, Lasson, supra note 37, 937 ("With the 
advent of computerized data banks such as Lexis and Westlaw, gleaning all the cases on point is as 
easy as playing Trivial Pursuit and maybe even more fun."). 
They also gave judges more opportunity to locate and cite controlling precedent in 
their opinions in lieu of nonbinding secondary sources like legal periodicals.40  
This greater discoverability of information applied to nonlegal material as well.41 
The ease and ubiquity of online searching since the 1990s facilitated the discovery 
and citation of online sources by both judges and attorneys with multiple studies 
showing an increase in citation to various nonlegal materials by the courts,42 
continuing a trend that began even before the advent of the Internet.43 Additionally, 
the consolidation of the legal publishing industry into a few large multinational 
conglomerates has made nonlegal sources more visible to legal researchers as 
traditional legal databases like Lexis and Westlaw now provide ready access to 
more than just traditional primary and secondary legal authority.44    
INCREASES IN CASE LAW AND CASELOAD 
Beyond the greater ease of locating case law on Lexis and Westlaw, there was also 
more of it. The exponential increase in the number of published and unpublished 
 
40 James H. Fowler & Sangick Deon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 
16, 16 (2008) (citing statements by Justices Ginsburg, Powell, and Stevens in support of the notion 
that judges, "are aware of the inherent weakness of the federal judiciary and place high value on 
maintaining their institutional and decisional legitimacy through the use of precedent"); see also 
David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful 
Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 337, 339 (1997) (offering two "central" reasons for 
the judicial use of citations: "The first is that citations indicate intercourt communication and 
influence on judicial decisionmaking . . . The second, and contrasting, view is that . . . citations are 
used to justify those decisions . . . That is, citations are seen as serving a primary function of 
legitimation."). 
41 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 495, 510–11 (2000). The quantity of data has also increased exponentially. See Bernard 
Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, 
FORBES, (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-
we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/ [https://perma.cc/SE3C-5FBM] 
("There are 2.5 quintillion bytes of data created each day at our current pace, but that pace is only 
accelerating . . . Over the last two years alone 90 percent of the data in the word was generated."). 
42 See e.g., John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in Supreme Court Opinions, 
94 LAW LIBR. J. 427, 442 (2002) ("[V]irtually every discipline, scientific or not, has become fair game 
for citation."); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of 
Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 496, 509 (2000) (authors found a threefold increase in citation to 
nonlegal sources by the U.S. Supreme Court from 1990 to 1998, and similar results in a sample of 
New Jersey Supreme Court opinions over the same period) and Ellie Margolis, Authority without 
Borders: The World-Wide Web and the Delegalization of the Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 920–21 
(2011) (citing several studies finding increased citation of nonlegal materials in judicial opinions). 
43 Daniels, supra note 19, at 4 (finding a 416% increase in the number of citations to secondary 
sources per opinion and an increase in citation to nonlegal sources of 1,429% from the 1900 Term to 
the 1978 Term). 
44 Schauer & Wise, supra note 41, at 511–13 (comparing the ease of accessing various nonlegal 
sources through Lexis and Westlaw at the turn of the millennium against the additional steps 
necessary less than thirty years prior). For example, Lexis Advance now offers access to news, 
medical and scientific publications, directories, and public records. 
opinions over the period of study45 meant that as time went on, judges simply had 
less need to consult law reviews to resolve the issues before them.46 As the body of 
common law continually expands to cover new topics and factual scenarios, judges 
are more likely to locate relevant opinions to substantiate their decisions, leaving 
law reviews for difficult cases involving "new or unsettled area[s] of law."47   
 
This ever-greater quantity of case law is a direct result of increasing caseloads faced 
by the judiciary,48 and has also likely reduced judges' reliance on legal scholarship, 
 
45 See Figure __, "Number of Opinions in Lexis Advance 1945-2018"; see also Merritt E. McAlister, 
Downright Indifference: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 
MICH. L. REV. 533, 542–46 (2020) (describing the increased caseload and proliferation of unpublished 
opinions at the federal appellate level since the 1960s, leading to the promulgation of Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 32.1 expressly authorizing citation of unpublished opinions in the circuit courts 
as of January 1, 2007).    
46 Pierce & Reuben, supra note 32, at 1196–97 ("[T]here is, quite simply, little need for a judge to 
support his or her opinion with a law review article if there is a case on point."). 
47 Id. at 1196 (quoting Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 
295, 296 (2000)) ("[T]he opinions most likely to rely on the works of academics are those written in 
the gray areas of the law where precedent doesn't provide a clear-cut answer."); see also Thomas L. 
Ambro, Citing Legal Articles in Judicial Opinions: A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
547, 549 (2006) (noting that he attempts to dispel the doubt that arises when deciding difficult cases 
by consulting all "reputable source[s] of information . . . This is where articles can play a significant 
role."). 
48 See e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Effectiveness of Measures to Increase 
Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J. LEGAL REFORM 415, 415 (1988) 
(noting that appellate caseloads have doubled approximately every ten years since World War II) 
 
as the data from a 2011 study of federal appellate courts "suggest[ed] that the 
busier a court is, in terms of the work required of each judge, the less likely it is to 
cite legal scholarship."49 This certainly makes sense given that a judge or clerk 
researching and writing under significant time constraints will likely focus on 
researching, and thus citing, mandatory authority as opposed to non-binding 
secondary sources.50 That the judge may have little faith she will find an article 
addressing the issue she is facing would only disincentivize her further from 
investing her limited time attempting to locate one.  
INCREASINGLY IMPRACTICAL SCHOLARSHIP—AN IVORY TOWER 
AFTERTHOUGHT 
The student editors of the inaugural issue of the Harvard Law Review shared the 
aspiration that they were "not without hope that the Review may be serviceable to 
the profession at large."51 I think it is safe to say they succeeded. From these 
humble beginnings, their journal and others like it would go on to have a 
tremendous impact on legal education, the legal profession, and on American 
society in general.52  
In the first decades of this study, as the proportion of citations increased, practical 
scholarship remained an important goal for law reviews as an institution, as service 
to the "practicing bar and the profession, and through them the nation as a whole" 
was stressed along with their pedagogical mission within their law schools.53 Law 
reviews became more accepted by the bench and bar as a result of their value to the 
 
and Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 59 (2016) 
(quoting Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287 
(2006)) (between the years 1971 and 2005, there was "'a 500% increase in filings, and a 77% increase 
in judgeships.' The result is a sizeable increase in the number of cases assigned to each judge."). 
49 Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 12, at 1366 (noting also that other variables beyond a court's 
workload likely influence citation to legal scholarship); see also McClintock, supra note 32, at 688 
(citing FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 110 
(1990)) (suggesting that an increase in judicial workloads may limit consultation of secondary 
sources). 
50 See Ambro, supra note 47, at 549 (discussing how time constraints require him to decide issues 
based on cases cited in briefs or found during  the course of his clerks' or his own research); see also 
Ryan Whalen et al., Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of Information, 9 ELON 
L. REV. 115, 134 (2017) ("Although there are many aspects of legal research, the search for relevant 
precedent is the most fundamental form of legal information seeking."). 
51 Notes, 1 HARV. L. REV. 35 (1887). 
52 See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (citing Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)) (calling Warren and Brandeis's 
article "the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law") and 
Newland, supra note 20, 483–88 (listing four other notable instances where law reviews influenced 
the Supreme Court's legal reasoning). 
53 John E. Cribbett, Experimentations in the Law Reviews, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 74 (1952); see also 
Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 448 (describing the two purposes of the law review as 
"educational value for the student" and "serv[ing] the profession directly"). 
profession,54 while the goal of furthering academic discourse did not merit mention 
among the primary objectives of law reviews in a 1952 article and was perhaps only 
considered tangentially in another from 1967.55 A generation later however, many 
scholars had increasingly branched out from traditional or "doctrinal" legal 
scholarship to engage each other in conversations that would largely exclude the 
judiciary and practitioners.56  
PUSHBACK AGAINST PRACTICALITY  
This trend away from traditional scholarship began in the 1970s as the elite law 
schools sought to differentiate themselves from their less-prestigious peers.57 And 
while much scholarship at this time still "reflect[ed] the impact of professional 
demands upon the academy,"58 as elite institutions increasingly directed their 
attention towards interdisciplinary studies and new schools of thought rather than 
 
54 See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. Even then, law reviews were seen more as practical 
research and teaching tools, not for their value to the reader. See Harold C. Havighurst, Law 
Reviews and Legal Education, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 22, 24 (1956) ("Whereas most periodicals are 
published primarily in order that they may be read, the law reviews are published primarily that 
they may be written.") and Alan W. Mewett, Reviewing the Law Reviews, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 188, 188 
(1955) ("Few reviews are read; and although most of them are skimmed over in the hope of finding 
something worthwhile to read, some perhaps do not even have that honor conferred upon them."). 
55 See Cribbet, supra note 53, at 74 and Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 449 (suggesting that 
in addition to their educational value and their service to the profession, law reviews "should 
contribute something more than useless verbiage to the ever-growing volume of legal journalism").  
56 See Laurens Walker, Developments in Law and Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV. 969, 
969–70 (1974) (citing David F. Cavers, "Non-Traditional" Research by Law Teachers: Returns from 
the Questionnaire of the Council on Law-Related Studies, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 534, 543 (1972)) 
(observing that "[m]ost legal research to date has been doctrinal in nature . . . typically organize[d] . . 
. around legal propositions and . . . us[ing] appellate court reports and other printed materials 
readily accessible in law libraries as [the] principal . . . source of data," while also noting that 
approximately one in six full time law faculty members surveyed in 1971 reported participating in 
"non-traditional" [interdisciplinary] research). A previous study examining the types of articles 
published in 1967 found only 54 articles out of more than 4,100 were based in empirical research. 
Noteboom & Walker, supra note 10, at 442 ("The law reviews have been derelict in the area of 
empirical research."). 
57 Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1118 (1981) 
(quoting Alumni Weekend, YALE L. REP. 4, 7–8 (1978-79)) (Judge Posner quotes Yale Law School 
Dean Harry Wellington as saying, "[t]here are a dozen or so university law schools in the country 
that can properly claim to be more than trade schools. A trade school is an institution that views its 
purpose a graduating students who will pass a bar examination. Schools that are more than trade 
schools share this purpose, but they are centrally concerned with the advance of knowledge through 
teaching and research."); see also Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE 
L.J. 1205, 1221 (1981) (discussing Yale Law School's desire to maintain its elite status through 
cutting edge scholarship). 
58 Id. at 1208. The contemporaneous data supports this assertion, as the proportion and quantity of 
opinions citing law reviews were at or near their respective peaks in this study. 
matters directly relevant to practice,59 their status and outsized influence meant 
this shift would have a disproportional effect on perceptions of the legal academy 
and legal scholarship among the bench and bar, even as much useful scholarship 
continued to be published.60   
BACK TO "NO RESPECT AT ALL"61  
By the 1990s, this perception had largely become reality.62 And even judges who 
regularly consulted law reviews for "the newest thinking on [a] subject . . . [and 
their] global yet profound perspective," noted that, "[p]rominent law reviews are 
increasingly dedicated to abstract, theoretical subjects . . . and less and less to 
practice and professional issues, and to the grist of state court dockets."63 In the 
most bellicose of these critiques from the bench at this time, Judge Harry Edwards 
of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, bemoaned the lack of practical 
scholarship in law reviews, categorizing law professors producing "mediocre 
 
59 For a description of the shift towards interdisciplinary studies in the academy, see RICHARD A. 
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 84–87 (1995); see also Bernard J. Hibbitts, supra note 36, at 640 (noting 
the growth of interdisciplinary research and the increasing importance of scholarship beginning in 
the mid-1970s). A further example of the shift away from practical scholarship at this time is the 
decline in legal treatise writing. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal 
Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 677–79 (1981) (positing that the 
growth of legal realism led to the decline in authorship and prestige of treatises). 
60 Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: 
A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353, 
370–71 (1996) (finding the ratio of articles perceived as "practical" versus theoretical decreased from 
4.88 in 1960 to 1.11 by 1985, but due to the increase in scholarly output over that time, the actual 
number of practical articles published increased from 736 to 1,296). 
61 In 1953, Judge Stanley Fuld said that law reviews had "earned the real respect of the bench." 
Fuld, supra note 30 at 918. Forty years later, they began to resemble the setup for one of comedian 
Rodney Dangerfield's punchlines. See Life, RODNEY DANGERFIELD, www.rodney.com 
[https://perma.cc/3ZFN-P5RY] (last visited July 13, 2020) ("Some chatty mob guys were the 
unintended inspiration for his signature catchphrase, 'I don’t get no respect.' Rodney overheard them 
talking about respect—during one of his shows—and it was a Eureka moment for him."); see also 
David Hricik and Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One: Law 
Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 761, 778 (2005) ("Articles that have little or no perceived value to anyone but a few law 
professors will come to be read only by those few law professors."). 
62 The idea that "perception is reality" entered our lexicon around this time, having been made 
famous by political strategist Lee Atwater during George H.W. Bush's 1988 presidential campaign. 
See Simon Kelner, Perception is reality: The facts won't matter in next year's general election, 
INDEPENDENT October 30, 2014 https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/perception-is-reality-
the-facts-wont-matter-in-next-years-general-election-9829132.html.  
63 Kaye, supra note 39, at 319; see also Kozinski, supra note 47, at 297 (Judge Kozinski described 
himself as a "big fan" of legal scholarship in his address, but also felt that, "[a]s best I can tell . . . 
some academics have almost a disdain for judicial interest in their work—or for whether and how 
their work will influence the outcome of cases."). But see Dolores K. Sloviter, In Praise of Law 
Reviews, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 7, 7 (2002) (Judge Sloviter commended law reviews as "an expeditious 
vehicle by which to receive a comprehensive introduction to an unfamiliar field of law . . . [and] an 
entrée into the most sophisticated thinking on the latest issues and trends"). 
interdisciplinary articles" as "ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject 
piques their interest, whether or not the subject merits legal scholarship."64  
Judge Richard Posner, who was perhaps the first member of the judiciary to note 
the shift away from doctrinal analysis at the elite law schools,65 agreed that "some 
crazy stuff is being published in law reviews nowadays,"66 but suggested that rather 
than "undergoing a serious decline . . . production [of doctrinal scholarship had] 
shifted towards scholars at law schools of the second and third tier."67  
This shift away from practical, doctrinal scholarship at the elite law schools and in 
their law reviews could help explain some of the shift away from the more 
prestigious, but more theoretical journals explored below,68 namely that the decline 
in the number and proportion of opinions citing to law reviews shown in Part I was 
driven in significant part by a decline in citations to the elite journals shown in Part 
II.69 Nevertheless, while the results of Part II show the gap in citation frequency 
has narrowed, there remains a striking preference among the judiciary for citing 
flagship journals from the elite law schools versus their less prestigious 
counterparts.  
 
64 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992); see also United States v. $639,558, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("[M]any of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of 
increasingly out-of-touch faculty members."). Several likeminded scholars joined the fray as well. See 
e.g., Lasson, supra note 37, at 931 (calling lead articles "often overwhelming collections of minutiae, 
perhaps substantively relevant at some point in time to an individual practitioner or two way out in 
the hinterlands—and that almost entirely by chance") and Thomas E. Baker, Tyrannous Lex, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 689, 712 (1997) ("[L]aw reviews are to law what masturbation is to sex. They are a form 
of self-gratification for law professors and law students. They do not satisfy the needs of others."). 
65 See Posner, supra note 57.  
66 POSNER, supra note 59, at 101; see also Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong with Elite Law Schools, 
WALL ST. J. June 8, 1993, at A16 (in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, Harvard Law School 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon decried the "alarmingly widespread disdain for the useful forms of 
legal scholarship that systematize, refine, and incrementally extend knowledge about 'law'"). 
67 Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1921, 1923 (1993). Judge Posner later noted that given "the increasingly able faculties of the lesser 
law schools, [t]he shift in legal doctrinal scholarship toward those faculties can hardly be considered 
a disaster for the profession." POSNER, supra note 59, at 95. 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 84–88; see also Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 61, at 780 n.3 
("We cannot ignore the fact that some of the most theoretical journals, those at the highest ranked 
schools, for example, are considered the most prestigious despite the lack of engaged scholarship.") 
and Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1321 (2002) ("Traditional 
doctrinal scholarship is disvalued at the leading law schools. They want their faculties to engage in 
'cutting edge' research and thus orient their scholarship toward, and seek their primary readership 
among, other scholars, not even limited to law professors, though they are the principal audience.").  
69 See McClintock, supra note 32, at 688 ("In light of the heated debate between academia and the 
bar, the decline in [judicial citation of] legal scholarship seems at least in part attributable to the 
proliferation of impractical scholarship."). 
PART II: THE ERODING BUT PERSISTENT CITATION ADVANTAGE OF ELITE 
LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEWS 
The second part of this study represents my attempt to see how the proportion of 
opinions citing to flagship journals from several different law schools, selected and 
grouped according to their average U.S. News Ranking, changed in relation to each 
other as technology, legal scholarship, and academic legal publishing evolved over 
the last forty-five plus years. The data shows a pronounced citation advantage for 
journals from the elite schools, especially Harvard and Yale, as compared with 
those further down the hierarchy. This difference was especially striking during the 
1970s, and despite some evidence of democratization, it is still clearly visible in the 
data for the most recent years of my study.    
JOURNAL SELECTION METHODOLOGY  
The U.S. News Best Law Schools Rankings, although controversial,70 are the most 
visible embodiment of a hierarchy that existed in the legal academy long before they 
were first published.71 Consequently, I used the Rankings as the basis for 
categorizing and selecting the journals I included for comparison in this part of my 
study, which looks at judicial citations over the years 1970 through 2018. Other 
studies that have used the rankings found a strong correlation between a law 
 
70 See e.g., David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A Response to Those 
Who Praise the Rankings and Suggestions for a Better Approach to Evaluating Law Schools, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 419, 423 (2003) ("[L]aw school rankings are so deeply and inherently flawed in concept 
that their publication does a profound disservice to persons trying to evaluate law schools.") and 
David Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law School Rankings and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 261 ("[T]he obsession with prestige encouraged by these rankings nurtures 
a dynamic in which the sizzle counts for more than the steak.").   
71 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa et al., Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 89 IND. L.J. 
941, 941, 998 (2014) (evaluating law schools over the decades prior to the U.S. News Rankings 
through the modern era and finding "a consistent hierarchy of U.S. law schools from the 1930s to 
present"); see also Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal 
Profession, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 501, 514–15 (a study conducted during the 1975-76 
academic year showed twenty elite law schools produced almost 60% of full-time law faculty, while 
graduates from five of those twenty schools [Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Michigan, and Chicago] 
accounted for just under a third of all full-time faculty). 
school’s rank and citations to its journals,72 especially among higher ranked 
schools.73 
Harvard and Yale were selected as the most elite law schools for the study since 
they are the two most prestigious institutions in the country with the longest 
continually running student-edited law reviews.74 To choose the exemplar "Top-14" 
law schools, I selected the three schools whose average ranking since 1987 fell 
closest to nine, the average of four and fourteen, while for tiers I and II, I chose 
twenty-five and seventy-five as my respective starting points for rankings. So for 
Tier I schools, I started with those ranked from 20 to 29 in 2018, recorded and 
averaged their ranks as far back as possible, and selected the three schools that 
came closest to twenty-five over that period.75 For Tier II, I had to expand my 2018 
schools to those ranked 65-82 in order to find three schools that had never fallen 
outside of Tier II or its earlier equivalents, "3rd Tier" and "Quartile 2."76 Meanwhile, 
Tier III schools showed the greatest variability, forcing me to select the institutions 
that had fallen outside of Tier III or its equivalent the fewest number of years, 
 
72 Ronen Perry, Correlation versus Causality: Further Thoughts on the Law Review/Law School 
Liaison, 39 CONN. L. REV. 77, 83–84 (2006) (finding law school reputation drives differences in 
citation: "law school reputation is usually the cause whereas law review success is the effect."); see 
also Gregory Scott Crespi, Judicial and Law Review Citation Frequencies for Articles Published in 
Different "Tiers" of Law Journals: An Empirical Analysis, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 897, 897 (2004) 
("[B]oth courts and scholars cite articles that are published in the three most prestigious law 
journals at much higher rates than they cite articles that appear in either mid-level or lower-tier law 
journals . . . [and] courts virtually ignore altogether legal scholarship that appears in lower-tier law 
journals."). 
73 See Alfred L. Brophy, The Relationship between Law Review Citations and Law School Rankings, 
39 CONN. L. REV. 43, 49 (2006) (noting a correlation between peer assessment score and citations in 
law journals for schools in the top 100 using data from the U.S. News Rankings and the Washington 
& Lee Journal Rankings); see also Ronen Perry, The Relative Value of American Law Reviews: 
Refinement and Implementation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2006) (finding a correlation between the 
overall rankings of law schools and their flagship journals, with a stronger correlation observed 
among higher-ranked institutions) and Ronen Perry, The Relative Value of American Law Reviews: A 
Critical Appraisal of Ranking Methods, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 35 (2006) (noting a correlation 
between citation frequency and higher law school rankings, especially among higher-ranked 
institutions). 
74 See supra notes 1–2. 
75 As this project moved forward over the ensuing two years, the exemplar schools remained the 
same for all categories after factoring in the 2019 and 2020 U.S. News Rankings. 
76 I also weighed ties in my rankings, so for example, if five law schools were each ranked 115, their 
weighted rank would each be 117. I believe this provides a more accurate benchmark for comparison 
between schools, as a difference as small as one point could see a school fall as many as twelve spots 
in the rankings. 
irrespective of average.77 Lastly, the three Tier IV schools in my study were the only 
law schools that never fell outside of Tier IV or its equivalent.78 
JOURNAL TITLE SEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To generate my citation data for Part II, I created search strings comprising all of 
the possible ways I could imagine a court might cite to a particular journal title, and 
limited my results by year.79 I would then scan my results and adjust my search as 
needed to remove as many false positives as possible.80 I also made sure to account 
for any name changes to the journals included in my study, for example Notre Dame 
Law Review was known as Notre Dame Lawyer until 1982, while Emory Law 
Journal was originally published under the title Journal of Public Law.81 I also 
excluded online companion journals such as the Harvard Law Review Forum from 
my searches since I considered them separate publications.82 Lastly, since this 
study focuses on the proportion of opinions citing to law reviews as opposed to the 
overall number of citations, I ultimately combined the search strings for my 
journals into one query for each grouping, so if an opinion cited both the California 
Law Review and the Virginia Law Review, for example, it would not be counted 
twice. 
FINDINGS OF FAVORITISM 
I suspected the judiciary would cite to the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law 
Journal, and the other high-ranked schools more often than those farther down the 
rankings, but I did not expect the difference to be as profound as the data reflected. 
These results suggest that perceived prestige of a law school is an important 
consideration when judges decide whether and to which law reviews they cite.  
 
77 There was a four-way tie between Cleveland State, Creighton, New York Law School, and the 
University of Missouri Kansas City, which I broke by choosing the school with the longest running 
journal.  
78 U.S. News divided law schools into five tiers in the mid-1990s.  
79 ("albany law review" OR "albany l. rev." OR "albany law rev." OR "alb. l. rev." OR "alb. l.r." OR 
"albany l.r.") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019). 
80 This sometimes resulted in convoluted, but hopefully more accurate search strings: ("california 
law review" OR "california l. rev." OR "california law rev." OR "cal. l. rev." OR "cal. l.rev" OR "cal. 
l.r.") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and not("s. cal. l. rev.") and not ("so. cal. l. rev.") and 
not("southern california law review") and not("comm. reports") and not("law review commission") and 
not("l. rev. circuit") and not("law review circuit") and not("l. rev. cir.") and not("d. cal. l.r.") and 
not("dist. cal. l.r.") and not("district of cal. l.r.") and not("s. cal. l.r.") and not("so. cal. l.r.") and 
not("cd cal. l.r.") and not("22 cal. l.r."). 
81 ("notre dame law review" OR "notre dame l. rev." OR "notre dame law rev." OR "notre dame law." 
OR "notre dame lawyer" OR "n.d. lawyer") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and not("notre 
dame l. rev. online") and not("notre dame law review online") and not("notre dame law school"). 
82 ("harvard law review" OR "harvard l. rev." OR "harvard law rev." OR "harv. l. rev." OR "harv. l.r." 
OR " review forum") and not("harv. l. rev. forum"). 
Harvard Law Review was cited in more opinions each year than any other journal 
from 1970 through 2018, with citations in more than twice the number of cases than 
its closest competitor, Yale Law Journal, most years between 1970 and 2010, with 
the gap narrowing somewhat over the past decade. Considered together, the 
proportion of opinions citing to these two journals out of the total number of 
reported opinions citing to at least one academic law review83 was highest at the 
beginning of the study period, reaching 34.4% in 1971.84 Meaning that, of all 
reported opinions in Part I that cited at least one academic legal periodical that 
year, more than one in three of those opinions cited either Harvard Law Review, 
Yale Law Journal, or both titles. This proportion decreased fairly steadily 
thereafter, falling below 25% in 1983, below 20% in 1989, and finally below 15% in 
2000, where it has remained since, reaching a low of 10.9% in 2007.  
My findings largely mirror those of other studies that found courts cited journals 
from elite law schools far more often than their less prestigious counterparts.85 
 
83 This was my combined search for opinions citing to the Harvard Law Review and Yale Law 
Journal for the year 2018: ("harvard law review" OR "harvard l. rev." OR "harvard law rev." OR 
"harv. l. rev." OR "harv. l.r." OR "harv lr" OR "harvard lr" OR "yale law journal" OR "yale l.j." OR 
"yale law jour." OR "yale law j." OR "yale l. jour.") & DA(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and 
not("harvard l. rev. forum") and not("harvard law review forum") and not("harv. l. rev. forum") and 
not("yale l.j. forum") and not("yale law journal forum") and not("yale l. jour. forum") and not("yale l.j. 
online") and not("yale law journal online") and not("yale l. jour. online") and not ("yale l.j. pocket 
part"). I entered the resulting number of reported opinions for each year into a spreadsheet, and 
divided that number by the total number of reported opinions from that year that cited at least one 
academic legal periodical (taken from Part I) and multiplied by 100 to arrive at my proportional 
percentage. 
84 895 (# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 and/or 𝑌𝑌𝐻𝐻𝑌𝑌)
2,603 (# 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐  𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙)
 = .3438 x 100 = 34.4% 
 
85 See, e.g., Saks et al., supra note 60, at 367 ("The rate of citation was about four times greater for 
articles in top-quintile law journals [versus other law reviews]."); McClintock, supra note 32, at 689; 
Crespi, supra note 72, at 909. Cf. Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and 
Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400, 404 (1986) (this study shows less of an advantage for the elite 
schools, but only looked at journal articles from one year).  
These studies almost invariably showed Harvard Law Review as the clear favorite 
among the judiciary.86 This was also true in the decades leading up to the 1970s.87  
 
 
Law reviews from the study’s three "Top 14" law schools, the University at 
California, Berkeley, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of 
Virginia, were also heavily cited, although never as frequently as those from 
Harvard and Yale. As was the case with Harvard Law Review and Yale Law 
 
86 See, e.g., McClintock, supra note 32, at 689 (finding Harvard Law Review received nearly twice as 
many judicial citations as Yale Law Journal, and nearly three times as many citations as third place 
Columbia Law Review); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 138, 142 
(1986) (finding Harvard Law Review received more than twice as many citations as its nearest 
competitors during the 1971-1973 and 1981-1983 October Supreme Court Terms); Crespi, supra note 
72, at 906 (finding 54 judicial citations to the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 volumes of the Harvard Law 
Review, compared to 35 for the same volumes of the Yale Law Journal; however, Harvard Law 
Review received fewer law review citations during that period than both Yale Law Journal and 
Stanford Law Review). The lone exception that looked at judicial opinions was a study of citations to 
journal articles from 1978-1979 using Shepard's Law Review Citations from 1984 finding Yale Law 
Journal was the most-cited law review, while Harvard Law Review was fifth. Mann, supra note 85, 
at 404.  
87 See Douglas B. Maggs, supra note 21, at 195 (even at this relatively early stage, when only 43 
academic law reviews were being published, Harvard Law Review had already emerged as the 
leading journal with 53 total judicial citations, more than doubling the second-place Yale Law 
Journal with eighteen citations) and Newland, supra note 20, at 482 (in a study of Supreme Court 
opinions between the October Term, 1924 through the October Term of 1956, the Court cited 
Harvard Law Review 399 times, more than double the 194 citations to the second-place Yale Law 
Journal). 
Journal, the proportion of opinions citing to these journals was highest during the 
1970s, reaching as high as 14.1% in 1970, then declining below 10% beginning in 
1984, below 5% in both 2002 and 2003, then remaining between 5.1 and 6.6% 
through 2018. Additionally, the total proportion of opinions citing to at least one of 
the journals from these three law schools remained below the total proportion of 
opinions citing to either Harvard Law Review or Yale Law Journal, despite the fact 
that the Top 14 group included citations for three journals instead of two.   
 
 
My exemplar Tier I law reviews were from Emory University School of Law, Notre 
Dame Law School, and the University of Iowa College of Law. Their combined 
citation rate was remarkably stable compared to the higher ranked schools above, 
reaching a high of 4.9% in 1973, and averaging 3.6% over the period of study, with a 
standard deviation of .005, as compared to .026 for the three Top 14 journals, and 
.075 for the Harvard and Yale data.  
My Tier II law schools were Loyola University of Chicago, the University of Kansas, 
and the University of Miami, while Albany, Drake University, and the University of 
Missouri at Kansas City represented Tier III. The data for the journals from the 
Tier II and Tier III law schools showed even less variability than the Tier I data, 
with a standard deviation of .003 for both datasets. Interestingly, the Tier III law 
reviews averaged slightly more citations than Tier II, with a mean of 1.6% versus 
1.4%. This indicates there may be less prestige variance between law schools in the 




Finally, journals from the Tier IV law schools included in the study, New England, 
North Carolina Central University, and Texas Southern University, were cited least 
often, exceeding 0.5% only two times during the period of study. On average, this 
group of journals appeared in only 0.26% of the total number of reported opinions 
citing to academic legal periodicals between 1970 and 2018. The Tier IV dataset 
also had the lowest standard deviation among the journal groupings, .001.   
Given these pronounced differences in citation rates between the different 
groupings of journals and the significant decrease in the proportion of citations to 
the elite journals over time, the balance of the article will be devoted to exploring 
potential reasons for the historic and continuing judicial preference for citing law 
reviews from the elite law schools and how changes in technology and academic 
publishing, have helped erode but not erase that advantage.  
REASONS JUDGES FAVOR ELITE LAW REVIEWS 
 
88 See Perry, supra note 72, at 88 ("Law review success is determined to a great extent by school 
reputation . . . [A]s we go down the school rankings . . . the gaps between the schools' reputations get 
smaller. The differences in attractiveness between the respective law reviews must also become 
smaller."). 
One factor that may drive up citations to elite law reviews is that journals from 
higher ranked schools tend to publish lengthier articles, and publish more articles 
per volume.89 This larger quantity of material gives their law reviews more 
opportunities to be cited,90 even as they devote more space within their journals to 
more esoteric or nondoctrinal topics.91 
In addition to publishing fewer and shorter articles, the extent to which law reviews 
at lower ranked schools focus on more localized issues will also impact their 
potential relevance to the judiciary. Devoting articles or even entire issues to 
surveys of state law, for instance, may increase the likelihood of being cited by 
courts within a law school's home state,92 but would substantially decrease the 
likelihood of being cited outside of it.93 
The prevalence of graduates of elite law schools among the judiciary, both among 
judges and their clerks94 could also help explain some of the favoritism they show 
for journals from higher ranked law schools.95 At least one study suggested that 
judges are more likely to cite journals from their alma mater,96 which makes sense 
 
89 Saks et al., supra note 60, at 365. 
90 James Leonard, Seein' the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in Recent American Law 
Review Articles, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 181, 193 (1990) ("Logically, all other things being equal, law 
reviews with more pages will be cited more frequently than less lengthy titles simple because there 
is more material to cite."). 
91 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text. 
92 Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals 
Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871, 885 (1996); see also Noteboom & 
Walker, supra note 10, at 448 (the majority of judges and attorneys responding to a 1966 survey "felt 
quite strongly that there should be increased emphasis on state law and other matters of local 
concern"). 
93 See Mann, supra note 85, at 415 (finding that journals whose scholarship focused on national 
issues had a higher rate of citation versus localized journals). 
94 Jason Iuliano & Avery Stewart, The New Diversity Crisis in the Federal Judiciary, 84 TENN. L. 
REV. 247, 279–98 (2016) (finding graduates from elite law schools, and Harvard in particular, are 
over-represented across the federal judiciary, with this discrepancy having increased significantly 
over the course of the twentieth century. The authors found a similar trend among those selected for 
federal clerkships, with graduates from the top five schools representing 24% of the total across the 
country. This advantage was even more pronounced among U.S. Supreme Court clerks, with 
graduates of Harvard and Yale law schools representing 24.8 and 19% of all clerks, respectively, 
between 1950 and 2015). 
95 See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 86, at 133–34 ("[J]udicial clerks hailing largely from elite 
schools may tend to cite the publications of their respective alma maters in their memoranda and 
opinion drafts."). 
96 See e.g., Richard G. Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review – A Citation-Counting Study of the Nebraska 
Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708 (1997) (finding judges who 
graduated from the University of Nebraska accounted for 40% of the Nebraska Supreme Court's 
opinions citing to the Nebraska Law Review, while graduates of Creighton University School of Law 
were less likely to cite it, accounting for 29% of the opinions citing the Nebraska Law Review. 
Meanwhile, judges who graduated from Creighton Law School were "nearly twice as likely (15 to 8) 
 
at least intuitively given the attachment that many of us feel to the educational 
institutions we attended.97 So not only are they likely to favor the law review they 
may have worked for during law school, as graduates of elite law schools 
themselves, they may also internalize the same value judgments about lower 
ranked law schools that motivate the hiring decisions of their judges.98 In fact, it is 
this longstanding elitism that is likely the most impactful factor driving citations 
disproportionately in favor of law reviews from elite law schools, both in the 
academy and among the bench and bar.99  
Indeed, the late Justice Antonin Scalia admitted this bias in his selection of law 
clerks,100 a bias that seems at least tacitly shared by many of his Supreme Court 
colleagues.101 It does not take a great inferential leap to suggest this elitism is also 
 
to cite the Creighton Law Review compared with their judicial colleagues who graduated from the 
University of Nebraska"). 
97 See e.g., Scott Gaier, Alumni Satisfaction with Their Undergraduate Academic Experience and the 
Impact on Alumni Giving and Participation, 5 INT'L J. EDUC. ADVANCEMENT 283–84 (2005) 
(reporting significant increases in both philanthropy and participation among alumni based on their 
reported level of satisfaction with their undergraduate academic experiences) and Fred Mael & 
Blake E. Ashforth, Alumni and their alma mater: A partial test of the reformulated model of 
organizational identification, 13 J. ORG. BEHAV. 102, 112–17 (1992) (noting that organizational 
prestige can enhance alumni attachment to their institution: "[H]ighly regarded schools are often 
steeped in lore and traditions which glorify their uniqueness and excellence."). 
98 William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are Law School Ties Choking 
the Profession?, ABA J. (July 1, 2012 10:20 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pedigree_problem_are_law_school_ties_choking_th
e_profession [https://perma.cc/W9NJ-QN9C] ("Students vetted through the rankings-era admissions 
process are now mid-career professionals who . . . strongly adhere to law school brands"); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 100–102. 
99 Merritt & Putnam, supra note 92, at 890 (citing Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review 
Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (1996)) (study compared most-cited articles from judicial 
opinions over the years 1989 – 1991 with the results of another study of most-cited articles 
appearing in legal periodicals over the same time period, finding "judges resemble academic authors 
in drawing their most heavily cited articles disproportionately from a few elite journals . . . [however, 
they] appear more willing to reach beyond the most prestigious journals in citing certain articles 
repeatedly."). 
100 Adam Liptak, On the Bench and Off, the Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2009) https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar.html [https://perma.cc/GJ3C-7HTU] (while 
explaining to a law student from American University why she is unlikely to be selected for a U.S. 
Supreme Court Clerkship, Justice Scalia told her, "By and large, I'm going to be picking from the law 
schools that basically are the hardest to get into. They admit the best and brightest, and they may 
not teach very well, but you can't make a sow's ear out of a silk purse. If they come in the best and 
brightest, they're probably going to leave the best and brightest, O.K.?"). 
101 Id. ("Over the last six years, the justices have hired about 220 law clerks. Almost half went to 
Harvard or Yale. Chicago, Stanford, Virginia, and Columbia collectively accounted for 50 others."). 
present when judges decide whether or not to cite to a particular article when 
writing an opinion.102 
This bias is certainly present in the academy as well, where a disproportionate 
number of professors come from the most elite law schools,103 and tenure decisions 
can hinge on placement in top law reviews.104 And while elitism is perhaps most 
visible among the practicing bar during the hiring process,105 as with the judiciary, 
I find it unlikely that these biases do not intrude once attorneys remove their 
"hiring caps" to work on research and writing. This makes them more likely to cite 
to elite journals in their briefs, which the court may, in turn, incorporate into its 
own analysis.106  
It is also possible that these differences in citation frequency reflect actual 
qualitative differences between articles published in the elite schools' journals 
versus those from less prestigious schools. It would follow that the "best and 
 
102 Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court's Use of 
Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. at 1020 ("Our results are consistent with the possibility that 
the [U.S. Supreme] Court is taking prestige of some sort when it uses legal scholarship. It might take 
the prestige of the author . . . [or] of the publishing law review or the institution affiliated with the 
law review."). 
103 See Howard A. Glickstein, Law Schools: Where The Elite Meet To Teach, 10 NOVA L.J. 541, 542–43 
(citing LAW SCHOOLS AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1980)) 
("59% of all law school teachers possessed J.D. degrees from one of the 20 top 'producer' schools, 
while almost 90% of tenure track faculty at the 20 'producer' schools held the J.D. from those same 
schools. Nearly a third of full-time law teachers received their J.D. degrees from one of five law 
schools (Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Michigan and Chicago)."). 
104 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, The Signaling Value of Law Reviews: An Exploration of Citations and 
Prestige, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 230 (2009) (describing the practice of "trading up" where faculty 
rescind a previously accepted journal placement when they receive an offer from a more prestigious 
journal, adding "for purposes of job placement and pay increases, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that articles placed in more prominent journals are more useful, as a general matter, than articles 
placed in more prominent journals. In fact, some schools are reputed to pay bonuses for articles 
placed in highly regarded journals. This is because evaluators use journal placement as a proxy for 
article quality."). See also Lisa Anderson, Law Journals Attack "Shopping" of Manuscripts, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 1995, at B6, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/12/us/law-journals-attack-shopping-
of-manuscripts.html [https://perma.cc/6LY9-MQQ7]. ("Law professors know that to move into their 
profession's tenured ranks their work must be published in law journals, the more prestigious the 
better."). 
105 Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 98 ("Snobbism and elitism are the last socially acceptable 
prejudices . . . largely rooted in vanity and identity, . . . [t]his near obsession with pedigree is not only 
paralyzing to the career prospects of individual lawyers; it is damaging to the entire profession.").    
106 See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 86, at 133 ("Attorneys may rely primarily on supportive 
articles in elite journals, because they hope that a journal's name will increase an article's 
persuasive power.") and William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A 
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267, 274 (2002) (comparing citations contained in briefs 
submitted to the Supreme Court during the October 1996 Term with citations appearing in the 
Court's opinions and finding 9.5% of legal periodicals in the winning side's briefs were also cited by 
the Court, while 7% of those from losing brief were cited). 
brightest" students,107 whose journals attract the most renowned scholars,108 would 
be in a position to produce the highest quality scholarship, but this is also difficult 
to measure.109 I also find it unlikely that qualitative differences alone can explain 
the stark discrepancies in citation frequency reflected in the data. However, the fact 
that these hierarchical differences in citation frequency have decreased suggests 
that judges have become more focused on the content of a journal rather than the 
name on the cover, or that the qualitative gap between the journals has narrowed 
over time.110 More likely, it is a culmination of many factors, including those 
explored below that have driven these changes.   
MIND THE (NARROWING) GAP: REASONS THE ELITE LAW REVIEW 
CITATION ADVANTAGE HAS ERODED  
Some of the factors behind the overall decline in judicial citation of law reviews 
have also helped to level a playing field that elitism and tradition had tilted steeply 
in favor of journals from the most prestigious law schools. Changes to the process of 
locating and retrieving legal information driven by technology and the expansion 
and evolution of scholarship into new areas driven by the elite law schools helped 
narrow the citation gap between law reviews from the lower and higher-ranked law 
schools. Additionally, the sharp increase in the number of legal periodicals being 
published over the period of study undoubtedly diluted the citation advantage of the 
elite journals, driving down the relative frequency with which they were cited. 
TECHNOLOGY: THE CONTINUING EFFECT OF CALR 
When Lexis and Westlaw began adding full-text, searchable law review articles to 
their databases in 1982, it marked the beginning of a slow but wholesale change in 
the way that legal researchers would access journal articles. Since both databases 
only added select titles to their databases, they initially increased discoverability of 
only those (mostly prominent) journals, which likely exacerbated the citation gap 
between the different institutions.111 However, as they expanded their selection of 
 
107 See supra note 100. 
108 See Jason P. Nance & Dylan Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process: Results from a 
National Study, 71 ALB. L. REV. 565, 589 (2008) (explaining student editors' consideration of author 
reputation in making editorial decisions to secure a competitive advantage for their journal). 
109 But see Crespi, supra note 72, at 917 ("[B]ecause of the filtering and sorting effects of the 
competitive editorial process . . . tier-specific differences in citation frequencies . . . might reflect with 
some accuracy the relative quality of the articles themselves."). 
110 See POSNER, supra note 59, at 95 ("No area of practice or doctrine is beyond the intellectual 
competence of the increasingly able faculties of the lesser law schools."). 
111 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 376; see also Hood, supra note 35, at 112 (noting that late as 
1987, Lexis offered full-text coverage of "over thirty" journals dating back to 1982, while Westlaw 
provided incomplete coverage for "many more" journals than Lexis over the same time period, but 
complete coverage for "top" legal journals only). 
periodicals, Lexis and Westlaw, along with HeinOnline112 and LegalTrac,113 
democratized legal research by facilitating discovery and access to all legal 
periodicals.114 
Once legal researchers began using these services, where search results are 
typically ranked by relevance and articles can be accessed with the click of a button, 
they would no longer need to pull a physical volume from a shelf.115 In theory, this 
should lead to a greater tendency for judges and clerks to consult all legal 
periodicals rather than just the most prestigious publications since online 
researchers are presumably "less likely to focus on the source and instead . . . focus 
more directly on the content of the material."116  
However, these technological changes may not have equated to a corresponding 
increase in citations to all legal periodicals, as judges who consult even the most 
useful article may nevertheless choose not to cite it.117 Additionally, the fact that 
judicial citations to the higher ranked law reviews began to decrease before the 
introduction and widespread adoption of full-text electronic access to legal 
periodicals indicates other factors have also contributed to this change.  
THE IVY LEAGUE IVORY TOWER 
The shift towards impractical scholarship at the more elite law schools beginning in 
the 1970s and 80s, as discussed above, likely also contributed to this trend.118 Quite 
simply, as elite law reviews published increasingly esoteric articles, frustrated 
 
112 HeinOnline established its online presence in May 2000. Joe Gerken, The Invention of 
HeinOnline, 18 AALL SPECTRUM 17 (Feb. 2014), https://heinonline.org/HeinDocs/Gerken.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JXW-ALDE]. 
113 LegalTrac was initially offered on disc before moving online. See Scott L. Rawnsley, 6 LEGAL 
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 169, 174 (1986). 
114 See Hibbitts, supra note 36, at 658–59. 
115 Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 53 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 903, 910 (2009) ("Hypertext linking gives the reader the ability to move around in a 
digitized textual document by opening a limitless array of additional links to other digitized 
material.").  
116 Margolis, supra note 42, at 934 (asserting that online research creates a blurring effect in regards 
to types of authority consulted by the legal researcher). I suspect this point is also valid when 
applied to different legal periodicals. But see Perry, supra note 73, at 32 (suggesting that, due to the 
prohibitive volume of material available, scholars "may base their reading strategies on law schools' 
reputation . . . assuming that journals of more prestigious schools will always publish better 
papers"). 
117 See Paul L. Caron, The Long Tail of Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 41 (2006) 
("Citations reflect one particular end-use of an article; they do not measure how many times an 
article is read but not cited."); see also Kaye, supra note 39, at 313 n.2 ("I read a great many more 
law review articles than I cite in my opinions.") and Margolis, supra note 42, at 917 ("New legal 
researchers are taught that [secondary] sources are useful for gaining general background about the 
law, but should rarely be cited directly in support of legal analysis."). 
118 See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text. 
judges were less likely to consult them.119 Meanwhile, the fact that concurrent data 
for the exemplar journals from Tiers I-IV did not show a similar decrease as their 
more prestigious counterparts provides further evidence that they retained their 
relative value to the judiciary throughout the period of study. This is especially 
notable considering the downward pressure exerted on the proportion of citations to 
all periodicals as a result of the increasing number of new journals established from 
the 1970s forward.  
DILUTION 
It is this final factor that I believe was most impactful in narrowing the hierarchical 
gap between the different tiers of law reviews, the exponential increase in the 
number of journals publishing legal content from the 1970s to present. These 
additional titles and the corresponding increase in articles these new journals 
published diluted the citation advantage enjoyed by the higher ranked law school 
journals through their sheer volume.120  
For example, in 1970, the Current Index to Legal Periodicals indexed 132 journals; 
by 2010, that number had increased to 616,121 and today it stands at over 650,122 an 
increase of 392%. Researchers today can search 944 titles in Lexis Advance's Law 
Reviews & Journals database123 and 1,040 titles on Westlaw Edge.124 And while 
perhaps not as ubiquitous as Lexis and Westlaw, LegalTrac indexes more than 
 
119 See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html 
[https://perma.cc/P3DJ-GCBD] (quoting Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Dennis Jacobs, "I 
haven't opened up a law review in years . . . No one speaks of them. No one relies on them."); see also 
McClintock, supra note 32, at 688 (speculating that one reason for the decline in judicial citations to 
law reviews is that judges no longer read them).  
120 Pierce & Reuben, supra note 32, at 1195 (authors labeled this concept "diffusion"); see also Robert 
M. Lawless & Ira David, The General Role Played by Specialty Law Journals: Empirical Evidence 
from Bankruptcy Scholarship, 80 AM. BANKR. L. J. 523 (2006) (in a study of legal scholarship in the 
field of bankruptcy, authors' findings "suggest that specialty journals play a different role than do 
the general law reviews, perhaps filling some of the lamented disjunction between the academy and 
the practicing legal community, including judges"). 
121 Alena Wolotira, From a Trickle to a Flood: A Case Study of the Current Index to Legal Periodicals 
to Examine the Swell of American Law Journals Published in the Last Fifty Years, 31 LEGAL 
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 150, 157 (2012) (showing an increase in the number of journals indexed by 
Current Index to Legal Periodicals from 90 in 1960 to 616 in 2010). 
122 CILP Journals, supra note 25.  
123 Email to Celine Murphy, Lexis Practice Area Consultant, (Dec. 12, 2019 9:45 AM) (on file with 
author). 
124 Secondary Sources, WESTLAW EDGE, 
https://www.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/SecondarySources/SecondarySourcesLibrary?transitionType
=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 (last visited July 7, 2020) To obtain my 
total, I filtered my results by Publication Type to "Law Reviews & Journals" only. 
1,200 different legal periodicals,125 while HeinOnline currently provides subscribers 
with full-text access to over 2,800 different titles through their Law Journal 
Library.126 So not only are there far more law journals today than in the past, 
articles are more easily discoverable for researchers than ever before. 
CONCLUSION 
Given these changes and others sure to come over the decades ahead, it will be 
interesting to see what the future holds in store for the student-edited law review. 
As Judge Judith Kaye remarked over thirty years ago, "In time, the judiciary's 
prejudice against citing law reviews gave way. More precisely, it collapsed and 
vanished without a trace."127 And while the contemporaneous data in his study 
support Judge Kaye’s assertion, the data also shows that another prejudice has 
endured, namely a strong bias among the courts in favor of citing law reviews from 
the most prestigious law schools.   
Additionally, while the judiciary’s prejudice against citing law reviews may have 
vanished for a time, it seems to have come back into fashion, considering the overall 
citation data from the last forty years and some of the criticisms from the bench 
over that time. Of course, the law review as an institution has always had its 
detractors,128 but it has also endured for over a century and continues to evolve. In 
fact, a study of Supreme Court opinions through 2010 found that Chief Justice 
Roberts used legal scholarship in 23% of his opinions.129 Despite the Chief Justice’s 
well-known reservations about the practical value of law reviews,130 this proportion 
was roughly in line with his colleagues.131 So perhaps there is some reason for 
optimism on behalf of law reviews after all.  
It remains to be seen if the recent increases in the proportion and quantity of 
opinions citing law reviews in this study portend greater reliance on legal 
scholarship by the courts in the coming years. Likewise, it will be interesting to see 
if the factors discussed above in Part II and others we have yet to consider continue 
 
125 Gale OneFile: LegalTrac, GALE, https://www.gale.com/c/onefile-legaltrac [https://perma.cc/ULR9-
PM2H] (last visited July 7, 2020). 
126 Law Journal Library, HEINONLINE, https://home.heinonline.org/content/law-journal-library/ 
[https://perma.cc/C5DK-74CW] (last visited July 7, 2020). 
127 Kaye, supra note 39, at 316.  
128 See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1936) ("There are two things 
wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is its content."). 
129 Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1025. 
130 See supra text accompanying note 3.  
131 Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 1025. 
to chip away at the citation advantage of the elite law reviews. In either case, only 
time, and future inquiry,132 will tell. 
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APPENDIX A  
My initial search included all academic journal citations possible before receiving a 
"502 Gateway Error" message from Lexis, which excluded those titles receiving 
fewer than seven citations during the period of study, 1945-2018.133  
 
132 See id. at 1020 ("[E]mpirical work is iterative, and future work should be performed to test, 
substantiate, and build on our results."). 
133 ("law review" OR "law journal" OR "l. rev." OR "law rev." OR "l.j." OR "l. jour." OR "jour. l." OR 
"journal of law" OR "j.l. pub." OR "j. urb. l." OR "j.l. tech." OR "j. crim. l." OR "j. const. l." OR "j. corp. 
l." OR "j. int'l. l." OR "j. int'l comp. l." OR "j. juv. l." OR "j. envtl. l." OR "j. fam. l." OR "j. on legis." 
OR "l. pol'y" OR "j. pub. l." OR "wash. u.l.q." OR "cornell l.q." OR "notre dame law." OR "n.y.u. l.q." 
OR "w.va. l.q." OR "l. soc. change" OR "am. crim. l.q." OR "ill. l. forum" OR "rev. col. abog." OR "j. 
pol. econ." OR "am. j. juris." OR "crim. l.q." OR "l.sch. j." OR "evtl. aff." OR "miami l.q." OR "iowa l. 
bull." OR "ind. legal forum" OR "marshall l.q." OR "harv. l. sch. bull." OR "duke bar" OR "n.y. l. 
forum" OR "urb. l. ann." OR "j. legal educ." OR "n.y. law forum" OR "neb. l. bull." OR "tul. tax. inst." 
OR "so. l.q." OR "ky. st. l. forum" OR "race rel. rep." OR "inst. on est." OR "u. ill. l.f." OR "j. small 
emerging bus. l." OR "n.y.l.f." OR "qlr" OR "clara law." OR "widener l. symp. j." OR "j. prac. proc." OR 
"crim. just. j." OR "law soc. ord." OR "j. art tech." OR "surv. int'l comp. l." OR "j. corp. fin. comm. l." 
OR "j. bus. entrepreneurship" OR "j. eur. l." OR "j. complex litig." OR "j. soc. just." OR "transnat'l l. 
contemp. probs." OR "j.l. comm." OR "u. bus. rev." OR "j. sports l." OR "l. soc. just." OR "j.l. religion" 
OR "j.l. family" OR "appalachian j.l." OR "j. health biomedical" OR "j. civ. rts." OR "l. psychol. rev." 
OR "j. conflict resol." OR "hall cir. rev." OR "j. bus. sec. l." OR "hum. rts. j." OR "fla. tax rev." OR "yale 
j. on reg." OR "j.l. sci. tech." OR "sports law. j." OR "j. int'l bus." OR "ecol. l.q." OR "j. global legal 
stud." OR "rev. banking fin." OR "l. bus. rev." OR "j. oil gas energy l." OR "crim. just. j." OR "j. med. 
l." OR "j.l. liberty" OR "j. affordable housing" OR "n.c. banking inst." OR "j. tech. intell." OR "j. 
gender race" OR "j.l. fam." OR "j. bus. tech. l." OR "cath. law." OR "u. mass. l. rev." OR "j. health 
pol'y" OR "j. pub. int. l." OR "j. race l." OR "j. gender soc. pol'y" OR "animal l." OR "j. ent. tech." OR 
"const. comment" OR "health matrix" OR "j.l. feminism" OR "j. women l." OR "contemp. legal issues" 
OR "sup. ct. rev." OR "j. app. prac." OR "temple l.q." OR "j.l. educ." OR "bill rts. j." OR "va. tax rev." 
OR "j. soc. pol'y l." OR "j.l. reform" OR "chi. legal f." OR "rev. l. pol." OR "seton hall legis. j." OR "rev. 
litig." OR "j. disp. resol." OR "j.l. ethics" OR "rev. l. soc." OR "j.l. bus." OR "surv. am. l." OR "law pol'y 
int'l" OR "law contemp. probs." OR "j. legal prof." OR "j. legal stud." OR "j.l. soc." OR "j.l. econ." OR 
"j. intell. prop." OR "j. empirical legal stud." OR "health l. pol'y" OR "j. air l." OR "j. legis." OR "envtl. 
l. pol'y rev." OR "j. computer info. l." OR "j. bus. l." OR "const. l.q." OR "geo. j. legal ethics" OR "j. 
corp. fin. l." OR "j. land use envtl." OR "emp. pol'y j." OR "bankr. dev. j." OR "l. pol'y f." OR "j. agric. 
l." OR "j. health care l." OR "j.l. arts" OR "j. transnat'l l." OR "j.l. soc. probs." OR "j.l. gender" OR "j. 
corp. fin. com. l." OR "j. sci. tech. l." OR "j. gender l." OR "j. lab. emp. l." OR "j. emp. lab. l." OR 
 
Due to the high number of false positives I received by including "l.j." in my initial 
search, I decided to run a second search and exclude the results from my initial 
totals, while ensuring all possible citation variations to academic law journals 
would not be subtracted.134 This search accounted for all academic journals with the 
 
"akron tax j." OR "law ineq." OR "j. trial advoc." OR "rev. int'l arb." OR "ark. l. notes" OR "rev. jur. 
u.p.r." OR "ecology l.q." OR "crim. civ. confinement" OR "nat. resources j." OR "j. urb. contemp. l." OR 
"j. on disp. resol." OR "j. contemp. l." OR "j.l. health" OR "j. int'l law" OR "rev. der. p.r." OR "sports 
ent. l." OR "resources envtl. l." OR "annals health l." OR "l. fam. stud." OR "j. comp. int'l l." OR "j. 
hum. rts." OR "ann. rev. banking l." OR "j. trial app. advoc." OR "lab. rel. rev." OR "j.l. fam." OR "j. 
high tech. l." OR "j.l. com." OR "balt. l.f." OR "j.c.r. c.l." OR "commlaw" OR "cap. def. j." OR 
"transnat'l law." OR "l. tech. j." OR "inst. on fed. tax'n" OR "rutgers l. rec." OR "soc. serv. rev." OR "f. 
on c.l. c.r." OR "j. civil rts." OR "legal rts. j." OR "j.l. pol." OR "j. for soc. just." OR "j. afr-am. l." OR 
"civ. rts. econ." OR "chi.-kent" OR "j. child fam. advoc." OR "j. s. legal hist." OR "j.c.r. econ.") & DA 
(aft 12-31-2017 & bef 01-01-2019) and not ("n.y.l.j.") and not ("comm. reports") and not ("law review 
commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and not ("law rev. commn") and not ("law rev. com.") and not 
("tax law rev.") and not ("admin. l. rev." and not ("mil. l. rev.") and not ("mass. l. rev.") and not 
("bank. inst. l. rev.") and not ("am. j. int'l l.") and not ("am. j. comp. l.") and not ("a.f. l. rev.") and not 
("fed. cts. l. rev.") and not ("am. l. rev.") and not ("mod. l. rev.") and not ("notre dame law school"). 
134 ("l.j.") & DA(aft 12-31-2010 & bef 01-01-2012) and not ("l. rev.") and not ("yale l.j.") and not 
("georgetown l.j.") and not ("hastings l.j.") and not ("duke l.j.") and not ("alb. l.j.") and not ("albany 
l.j.") and not ("cornell l.j.") and not ("emory l.j.") and not ("ind. l.j.") and not ("indiana l.j.") and not 
("rutgers l.j.") and not ("widener l.j.") and not ("geo. l.j.") and not ("n.c. cent. l.j.") and not ("miss. l.j.") 
and not ("ill. l.j.") and not ("tex. l.j.") and not ("texas l.j.") and not ("ky. l.j.") and not ("hast. l.j.") and 
not ("tech.l.j.") and not ("depaul bus.") and not ("berkeley bus. l.j.") and not ("hastings bus. l.j.") and 
not ("duq. bus. l.j.") and not ("rutgers bus. l.j.") and not ("entrepen. bus. l.j.") and not ("davis bus. l.j.") 
and not ("vand. l.j.") and not ("u.p.r. bus. l.j.") and not ("rico bus. l.j.") and not ("nevada l.j.") and not 
("chi. l.j.") and not ("kentucky l.j.") and not ("mary's l.j.") and not ("marys l.j.") and not ("ohio l.j.") 
and not ("nev. l.j.") and not ("denver l.j.") and not ("brandeis l.j.") and not ("basin l.j.") and not ("hall 
l.j.") and not ("thomas l.j.") and not ("hamline l.j.") and not ("willamette l.j.") and not ("rock l.j.") and 
not ("ualr l.j.") and not ("washburn l.j.") and not ("wash. l.j.") and not ("u. ark. l.j.") and not ("hasting 
l.j.") and not ("tulsa l.j.") and not ("wyoming l.j.") and not ("blackletter l.j.") and not ("coastal l.j.") and 
not ("wyo. l.j.") and not ("nova l.j.") and not ("denv. l.j.") and not ("den. l.j.") and not ("louis l.j.") and 
not ("howard l.j.") and not ("how. l.j.") and not ("cam. l.j.") and not ("camden l.j.") and not ("u.a.l.r. 
l.j.") and not ("marshall l.j.") and not ("state l.j.") and not ("u. l.j.") and not ("univ. l.j.") and not ("det. 
l.j.") and not ("envtl. l.j.") and not ("envt. l.j.") and not ("env. l.j.") and not ("st. l.j.") and not ("const. 
l.j.") and not ("world l.j.") and not ("admin l.j. am.") and not ("pac. l.j.") and not ("pacific l.j.") and not 
("sci. l.j.") and not ("l.j. sci.") and not ("y.l.j.") and not ("md. l.j.") and not ("int'l l.j.") and not ("intl. 
l.j.") and not ("international l.j.") and not ("interest l.j.") and not ("int. l.j.") and not ("hofstra lab. l.j.") 
and not ("comp. lab. l.j.") and not ("educ. l.j.") and not ("prop. l.j.") and not ("can.-u.s. l.j.") and not 
("ent. l.j.") and not ("entertainment l.j.") and not ("conn. ins. l.j.") and not ("elder l.j.") and not ("fed. 
comm. l.j.") and not ("urb. l.j.") and not ("urban l.j.") and not ("women's l.j.") and not ("rights l.j.") and 
not ("rts. l.j.") and not ("rits. l.j.") and not ("immigr. l.j.") and not ("immigration l.j.") and not 
("gaming l.j.") and not ("emp. l.j.") and not ("empl. l.j.") and not ("bus. com. l.j.") and not ("tax l.j.") 
and not ("sports l.j.") and not ("mar. l.j.") and not ("maritime l.j.") and not ("con. l.j.") and not ("black 
l.j.") and not ("dev. l.j.") and not ("resol. l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac health l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac 
prob. l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac probate l.j.") and not ("hofstra labor l.j.") and not ("conn. prob. l.j.") 
and not ("detroit l.j.") and not ("conn. probate l.j.") and not ("interdisc. l.j.") and not ("interdis. l.j.") 
and not ("interdisciplinary l.j.") and not ("transp. l.j.") and not ("trans. l.j.") and not ("commercial 
l.j.") and not ("asian am. l.j.") and not ("asian l.j.") and not ("actec l.j.") and not ("tch. l.j.") and not 
("reserve l.j.") and not ("indian l.j.") and not ("computer l.j.") and not ("drug l.j.") and not ("cosm. l.j.") 
 
exception of a small handful with only one citation over the course of 1945-2018 that 
could not be included in the search string due to Lexis Advance's character limit. 
Next, since I excluded various commercial or other non-academic publications such 
as New York Law Journal or Administrative Law Review, from my initial searches 
using Lexis Advance’s and not function, I then ran searches for these journals 
independently and added back those opinions that also cited to academic 
journals.135 
Additionally, after discovering that many courts used the abbreviations "l.r." for 
"law review" or "law j." for "law journal," I ran separate searches for opinions citing 
academic law journals using those abbreviations while also crafting my search to 
exclude false positives and prevent double-counting opinions already included in 
previous searches to the greatest extent possible.136   
 
and not ("raza l.j.") and not ("ohio s. l.j.") and not ("dame l.j.") and not ("loy. l.j.") and not 
("southwestern l.j.") and not ("u. chicago l.j.") and not ("mich. l.j.") and not ("will. l.j.") and not ("geor. 
l.j.") and not ("harvard l.j.") and not ("wis. internat. l.j.") and not ("tex. internat. l.j.") and not ("envt'l 
l.j.") and not ("o.s. l.j.") and not ("tul. l.j.") and not ("fordham internat. l.j.") and not ("ethnic anc. l.j.") 
and not ("software l.j.") and not (s.w. l.j.") and not ("sw. l.j.") and not ("comp. l.j.") and not ("u.s.-mex. 
l.j.") and not ("poverty l.j.") and not ("phoenix l.j.") and not ("ariz. l.j.") and not ("tran. l.j.") and not 
("admin. l.j.") and not ("technology l.j.") and not ("transnat'l l.j.") and not ("indus. rel. l.j.") and not 
("industrial relations l.j.") and not ("ind. rel. l.j.") and not ("trade l.j.") and not ("n.y.l.j.") and not 
("comm. reports") and not ("law review commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and not ("law rev. 
commn") and not ("law rev. com.") and not ("tax law rev.") and not ("law review") and not ("law 
journal") and not ("l.rev.") and not ("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not ("l. jour.") and not ("jour. l.") 
and not ("journal of law") and not ("l.q.") and not ("pol'y") and not ("j. envtl.") and not ("j. pub.") and 
not ("j. int'l l.") and not ("j. corp. l.") and not ("j. crim. l.") and not ("j. const. l.") and not("int'l comp. 
l.") and not ("j. fam. l.") and not ("notre dame law."). 
135 This was accomplished by searching for ("admin. l. rev.") & DA (aft 12-31-1944), then using Lexis' 
"Search within" feature to highlight the terms "l. rev. OR "j.l." OR "l.j." Once the terms were 
highlighted in my results list, I could sort by "Reported" under "Publication Status," sort by date, 
then tally any results that also cited to academic legal periodicals. 
136 My "L.R." Search: "univ. l.r." OR "u. l.r." OR "harv. l.r." OR "harvard l.r." OR "harvard lr" OR 
"harv lr" OR "colum. l.r" OR "columbia l.r." OR "columb. l.r." OR "columbia lr" OR "stan. l.r." OR 
"stanford l.r." OR "cornell l.r." OR "cornell lr" OR "chi. l.r." OR "chicago l.r." OR "chi lr" OR "rts. l.r." 
OR "akron l.r." OR "ala. l.r." OR "alabama l.r." OR "alaska l.r." OR "alb. l.r." OR "albany l.r." OR 
"am. crim. l.r." OR "am. u. l.r." OR "ariz. l.r." OR "arizona l.r." OR "ark. l.r." OR "baylor l.r." OR 
"brooklyn l.r." OR "buff. l.r." OR "buffalo l.r." OR "buff. crim. l.r." OR "cardozo l.r." OR "w. res. l.r." 
OR "western res. l.r." OR "chicago-kent l.r." OR "cath. l.r." OR "chi-kent l.r." OR "clev. st. l.r." OR 
"cleve. st. l.r." OR "conn. l.r." OR "col. l.r." OR "c.r.-c.l. l.r." OR "creighton l.r." OR "cumberland l.r." 
OR "dakota l.r." OR "depaul l.r." OR "dick. l.r." OR "dickinson l.r." OR "drake l.r." OR "drexel l.r." 
OR "duq. l.r." OR "duquesne l.r." OR "fordham l.r." OR "ind. comm. l.r." OR "ga. l.r." OR "wash. l.r." 
OR "gonzaga l.r." OR "houston l.r." OR "hous. l.r." OR "new eng. l.r." OR "bus. l.r." OR "tech. l.r." OR 
"hofstra l.r." OR "idaho l.r." OR "iowa l.r." OR "kan. l.r." OR "kansas city l.r." OR "la. l.r." OR "loy. 
l.r." OR "loyola l.r." OR "l.a. l.r." OR "marq. l.r." OR "marquette l.r." OR "mercer l.r." OR "md. l.r." 
OR "mich. l.r." OR "michigan l.r." OR "minn. l.r." OR "minnesota l.r." OR "mo. l.r." OR "mont. l.r." 
OR "mtn. l.r." OR "neb. l.r." OR "n.c. l.r." OR "n.m. l.r." OR "n. ky. l.r." OR "nova l.r." OR 
 
 
"northwestern l.r." OR "dame l.r." OR "nyu lr" OR "pepp. l.r." OR "pepperdine l.r." OR "rutgers l.r." 
OR "john's l.r." OR "diego l.r." OR "clara l.r." OR "seton hall l.r." OR "smu l.r." OR "s. tex. l.r." OR 
"cal. l.r." OR "johns l.r." OR "louis l.r." OR "suffolk l.r." OR "syracuse l.r." OR "tax l.r." OR "cooley 
l.r." OR "marshall l.r." OR "tul. l.r." OR "tulane l.r." OR "ucla l.r." OR "u.c.l.a. l.r." OR "balt. l.r." OR 
"u.c. davis l.r." OR "u.m.k.c. l.r." OR "umkc l.r." OR "cin. l.r." OR "cincinnati l.r." OR "u. colo. l.r." OR 
"dayton l.r." OR "water l.r." OR "mercy l.r." OR "fla. l.r." OR "ill. l.r." OR "miami l.r." OR "okla. l.r." 
OR "pa. l.r." OR "penn. l.r." OR "pitt. l.r." OR "pittsburgh l.r." OR "rich. l.r." OR "tenn. l.r." OR "tex. 
l.r." OR "tol. l.r." OR "toledo l.r." OR "tulsa l.r." OR "utah l.r." OR "vand. l.r." OR "vanderbilt l.r." OR 
"vand lr" OR "vill. l.r." OR "villanova l.r." OR "va. l.r." OR "forest l.r." OR "wash. lee l.r." OR "va lr" 
OR "washington l.r." OR "wayne l.r." OR "wayne lr" OR "western l.r." OR "wm. mary l.r." OR "wm. 
mitchell l.r." OR "wis. l.r." OR "wyo. l.r." & DA (aft 12-31-1944) and not ("l.j.") and not ("j.l.") and not 
("l. jour.") and not ("jour. l.") and not ("l. rev.") and not ("law review") and not ("law journal") and not 
("journal of law") and not ("d. ala. l.r.") and not ("d. alaska l.r.") and not ("dist. alaska l.r.") and not 
("l.r. co.") and not ("d. pa. l.r.") and not ("pa. l.r.b.") and not ("pa. l.r. bd") and not ("d. va. l.r.") and 
not ("d. w.va. l.r.") and not ("va. l.r. civ.") and not ("va. l.r.n.s.") and not ("d. wash. l.r.") and not ("d. 
wis. l.r.") and not ("d. ariz. l.r.") and not ("d. cal. l.r.") and not ("dist. cal. l.r.") and not ("d. ill. l.r.") 
and not ("d. minn. l.r.") and not ("d. md. l.r.") and not ("d. mich. l.r.") and not ("d. tex. l.r.") and not 
("d. mo. l.r.") and not ("d. iowa") and not ("dist. iowa") and not ("l.r. co.") and not ("iowa l.r.a.") and 
not ("d. neb. l.r.") and not ("d. mont. l.r.") and not ("d. la. l.r.") and not ("d. n.c. l.r.") and not ("d. fla. 
l.r.") and not ("d. okla. l.r.") and not ("d. tenn. l.r.") and not ("d. ga. l.r.") and not ("buffalo l.r. ry.") 
and not ('buffalo l.r.r.") and not ("district of michigan l.r.") and not ("d. conn. l.r.") and not ("d. idaho 
l.r.") and not ("dist. idaho") and not ("d. kan. l.r.") and not ("l.r. hannen, burlington") and not ("hatch 
v. cincinnati") and not ("pittsburgh l.r. rd.") and not ("utah l.r.b.") and not ("utah l.r. board") and not 
("utah l.r. gardiner") and not ("d. n.m. l.r.") and not ("ass'n m.l.r.b.") and not ("n.m.l.r. civ. 7.1") and 
not ("d. va. lr") and not ("va lr civ.") and not ("d. wyo. l.r.") and not ("arizona l.r. civ.") and not 
("arizona l.r.b.p.") and not ("dakota l.r. foy") and not ("dakota l.r. 1.3") and not ("gray nova l.r.'s 
mother") and not ("on the bus l.r. testified") and not ("22 cal. l.r."). 
This was my "Law J." search string: ("yale law j." OR "georgetown law j." OR "hastings law j." OR 
"duke law j." OR "alb. law j." OR "albany law j." OR "cornell law j." OR "emory law j." OR "ind. law 
j." OR "indiana law j." OR "rutgers law j." OR "widener law j." OR "geo. law j." OR "n.c. cent. law j." 
OR "miss. law j." OR "ill. law j." OR "tex. law j." OR "texas law j." OR "ky. law j." OR "hast. law j." 
OR "tech. law j." OR "depaul bus. law j." OR "berkeley bus. law j." OR "hastings bus. law j." OR "duq. 
bus. law j." OR "rutgers bus. law j." OR "entrepen. bus. law j." OR "davis bus. law j." OR "vand. law 
j." OR "u.p.r. bus. law j." OR "rico bus. law j." OR "nevada law j." OR "chi. law j." OR "kentucky law 
j." OR "mary's law j." OR "marys law j." OR "ohio law j." OR "nev. law j." OR "denver law j." OR 
"brandeis law j." OR "basin law j." OR "hall law j." OR "st. thomas law j." OR ("hamline law j.") OR 
("willamette law j.") OR "little rock law j." OR "ualr law j." OR "washburn law j." OR "wash. law j." 
OR "u. ark. law j." OR "hasting law j." OR "tulsa law j." OR "wyoming law j." OR "blackletter law j." 
OR "coastal law j." OR "wyo. law j." OR "nova law j." OR "denv. law j." OR "den. law j." OR "louis 
law j." OR "howard law j." OR "how. law j." OR "cam. law j." OR "camden law j." OR "u.a.l.r. law j." 
OR "marshall law j." OR "state law j." OR "u. law j." OR "univ. law j." OR "university law j." OR "det. 
law j." OR "envtl. law j." OR "envt. law j." OR "env. law j." OR "environmental law j." OR "st. law j." 
OR "const. law j." OR "constitutional law j." OR "world law j." OR "admin. law j. am." OR "pac. law 
j." OR "pacific law j." OR "sci. law j." OR "law j. sci." OR "md. law j." OR "int'l law j." OR "intl. law 
j." OR "international law j." OR "interest law j." OR "int. law j." OR "hofstra lab. law j." OR "hofstra 
labor law j." OR "comp. lab. law j." OR "comporative labor law. j." OR "educ. law j." OR "education 
law j." OR "prop. law j." OR "property law j." OR "can.-u.s. law j." OR "ent. law j." OR "entertainment 
law j." OR "conn. ins. law j." OR "elder law j." OR "fed. comm. law j." OR "urb. law j." OR "urban law 
j." OR "women's law j." OR "rights law j." OR "rts. law j." OR "rits. law j." OR "immigr. law j." OR 
"immigration law j." OR "gaming law j." OR "emp. law j." OR "empl. law j." OR "employment law j." 
OR "bus. com. law j." OR "tax law j." OR "sports law j." OR "mar. law j." OR "maritime law j." OR 
 
Finally, I crafted searches for citations to all academic journals excluded from my 
previous searches attempting to exclude opinions citing to those journals that were 
 
"con. law j." OR "black law j." OR "dev. law j." OR "resol. law j." OR "quinnipiac health law j." OR 
"quinnipiac probate law j." OR "quinnipiac probate law j." OR "conn. prob. law j." OR "detroit law j." 
OR "conn. probate law j." OR "interdisc. law j." OR "interdis. law j." OR "interdisciplinary law j." OR 
"transp. law j." OR "trans. law j." OR "commercial law j." OR "asian am. law j." OR "asian law j." OR 
"actec law j." OR "tch. law j." OR "reserve law j." OR "indian law j." OR "computer law j." OR "drug 
law j." OR "cosm. law j." OR "raza law j." OR "ohio state law j." OR "dame law j." OR "loy. law j." OR 
"southwestern law j." OR "u. chicago law j." OR "mich. law j." OR "will. law j." OR "geor. l.j." OR 
"harvard law j." OR "envt'l law j." OR "tul. law j." OR "tulane law j." OR "ethnic anc. law j." OR 
"software law j." OR "s.w. law j." OR "southwestern law j." OR "comp. law j." OR "comparative law j." 
OR "u.s.-mex. law j." OR "poverty law j." OR "phoenix law j." OR "ariz. law j." OR "transportation law 
j." OR "admin. l.j." OR "administrative law j." OR "technology law j." OR "transnat'l law j." OR 
"transnational law j." OR "indus. rel. law j." OR "industrial relations law j." OR "ind. rel. law j." OR 
"trade law j.") & DA (aft 12-31-1944 & bef 01-01-2019) and not ("n.y.l.j.") and not ("comm. reports") 
and not ("law review commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and not ("law rev. commn") and not 
("law rev. com.") and not ("tax law rev.") and not ("law review") and not ("law journal") and not 
("l.rev.") and not ("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not ("l. jour.") and not ("jour. l.") and not ("journal of 
law") and not ("l.q.") and not ("pol'y") and not ("j. envtl.") and not ("j. pub.") and not ("j. int'l l.") and 
not ("j. corp. l.") and not ("j. crim. l.") and not ("j. const. l.") and not("int'l comp. l.") and not ("j. fam. 
l.") and not ("notre dame law."). 
already included in my previous totals.137 I then scanned these results to ensure no 
false positives were included.138  
 
137 The search string for citations excluded from my initial "L.R." query: ("az. l.r." OR "int'l l.r." OR 
"pennsylvania l.r." OR "gate l.r." OR "puget sound l.r." OR "u. of hawaii l.r." OR "wesleyan l.r." OR "l. 
sch. l.r." OR "n.c. cent. l.r." OR "univ. ill. l.r." OR "seattle l.r." OR "u. of ill. l.r." OR "touro l.r." OR 
"miss. c.l.r." OR "gonz. l.r." OR "vanderbilt lr" OR "geo. mason l.r." OR "u.s.f. l.r." OR "coll. l.r." OR 
"evtl. aff. l.r." OR "int'l comp. l.r" OR "mary's l.r." OR "liberties l.r." OR "willamette l.r." OR "widener 
l.r." OR "whittier l.r." OR "washburn l.r." OR "southwestern l.r." OR "richmond l.r." OR "u.s.f. l.r." 
OR "francisco l.r." OR "samford l.r." OR "denver l.r." OR "u.d.c. l.r." OR "f.s.u. l.r." OR "ohio state l.r." 
OR "cal. davis l.r." OR "valpo l.r." OR "valparaiso l.r." OR "william mary l.r." OR "northern l.r." OR 
"cleveland state l.r." OR "ucd l.r." OR "uc davis l.r." OR "amer. crim. l.r." OR "new crim. l.r." OR 
"boston college l.r." OR "stetson l.r." OR "byu l.r." OR "cal. w. l.r." OR "cath. l.r." OR "mex. l.r." OR 
"louisiana l.r." OR "kansas l.r." OR "or. l.r." OR "n.d. l.r." OR "s.c. l.r." OR "me. l.r." OR "nebraska 
l.r." OR "vt. l.r." OR "oklahoma l.r." OR "oregon l.r." OR "virginia l.r." OR "carolina l.r." OR "car. l.r." 
OR "baltimore l.r." OR "s.w. l.r." OR "s.d. l.r.") & DA (aft 12-31-1944 & bef 01-01-2019) and not 
("l.r.s.") and not ("l.r.a.") and not ("l.r. bd.") and not ("n.s.w.l.r.") and not ("d. kansas l.r.") and not 
("dist. of new mex. l.r.") and not ("d. new mex. l.r.") and not ("d. louisiana l.r.") and not ("d. 
pennsylvania l.r.") and not ("pennsylvania l.r. board") and not ("pennsylvania l.r.b.") and not ("d. 
s.d.") and not ("d. vt.") and not ("district of nebraska") and not ("me. l.r.b.") and not ("d. me.") and not 
("d. az. l.r.") and not ("d. s.c.") and not ("d. n.d. l.r.") and not ("n.y.n.d. l.r.") and not ("d. or.") and not 
("l.j.") and not ("comm. reports") and not ("law review commission") and not ("law rev. comm") and 
not ("law rev. commn") and not ("law rev. com.") and not ("tax law rev.") and not ("law review") and 
not ("law journal") and not ("l.rev.") and not ("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not ("l. jour.") and not 
("jour. l.") and not ("journal of law") and not ("l.q.") and not ("pol'y") and not ("j. envtl.") and not ("j. 
pub.") and not ("j. int'l l.") and not ("j. corp. l.") and not ("j. crim. l.") and not ("j. const. l.") and 
not("int'l comp. l.") and not ("j. fam. l.") and not ("notre dame law."). 
My final excluded citations search string: ("va. l. weekly" OR "cal. reg. l. rep." OR "intel. prop. rev." 
OR "j.c.l. c.r." OR "j. envt'l admin. l." OR "j. global trade" OR "nat. l. f." OR "pitt. tax rev." OR "ind. 
legal f." OR " j. afr.-am. l." OR "rich. j. global l." OR "civ. l. f." OR "j. sci. tech. envtl. l." OR "intell. 
prop. j." OR "j. envtl. pub. health l." OR "inst. on mineral" OR "j. prac. clinical l." OR "rev. ent. sports 
l." OR "j. int'l media" OR "j. food l." OR "j. health hosp. l." OR "j.l. soc'y" OR "mary pol'y rev." OR 
"juris rev." OR "l. bus. rev. am." OR "j. int'l arb." OR "j. pub. int'l l." OR "j. tax l." OR "j. asian l." OR 
"j. equine" OR "j. chinese l." OR "j. racial ethnic" OR "j. on legal malpractice" OR "j. comp. corp. l." 
OR "rev. int'l l." OR "major tax plan." OR "pub. int. l. rep." OR "j.c.r. econ." OR "world pub. ord." OR 
"int'l l.f." OR "ind. l.f." OR "loyola l.j." OR "depaul l.j." OR "camd. l.j." OR "southwest l.j." OR "so. tx. 
l.j." OR "suffolk t. l.j." OR "hasings l.j." OR "adm. l.j." OR "intenatl l.j." OR "williamette l.j." OR "ann. 
surv. mass. l." OR "dakota bar briefs" OR "chi.-kent rev." OR "contemporary law pamphlets" OR 
"denver law center journal" OR "denv. l. ctr. j." OR "hastings con." OR "hastings constitutional law 
quarterly" OR "j. radio l." OR "natural law forum" OR "nat. res. j." OR "iowa law bulletin" OR 
"nebraska law bulletin" OR "s. car. l.q." OR "int'l l. forum" OR "l. sch. record" OR "ill. l.q.")& DA (aft 
12-31-1944 & bef 01-01-2019) and not("law review") and not("law journal") and not("l.rev.") and 
not("law rev.") and not ("j.l.") and not("l. jour.") and not("jour. l.") and not("journal of law") and 
not("n.y.l.j.") and not("pol'y") and not("j. envtl.") and not("j. pub.") and not("j. int'l l.") and not("j. corp. 
l.") and not("j. crim. l.") and not("j. const. l.") and not("int'l comp. l.") and not("j. fam. l.") and 
not("notre dame law.") and not ("yale l.j.") and not ("georgetown l.j.") and not ("hastings l.j.") and not 
("duke l.j.") and not ("alb. l.j.") and not ("albany l.j.") and not ("cornell l.j.") and not ("emory l.j.") and 
not ("ind. l.j.") and not ("indiana l.j.") and not ("rutgers l.j.") and not ("widener l.j.") and not ("geo. 
l.j.") and not ("n.c. cent. l.j.") and not ("miss. l.j.") and not ("ill. l.j.") and not ("tex. l.j.") and not ("texas 
l.j.") and not ("ky. l.j.") and not ("hast. l.j.") and not ("tech.l.j.") and not ("depaul bus.") and not 
("berkeley bus. l.j.") and not ("hastings bus. l.j.") and not ("duq. bus. l.j.") and not ("rutgers bus. l.j.") 
 
I believe these searches were as comprehensive as possible, but due to potential 
citation discrepancies in the opinions and potential human error, including every 
citation over the period studied is impossible. That being said, I am confident that 
the results are as accurate as possible, despite these limitations.  
In terms of compiling my results, since my data represents opinions citing journals 
rather than total citations, multiple citations in an opinion were not counted. 
Therefore, if an opinion cited more than one journal in Part I or if an opinion cited a 
particular journal title more than once, or multiple journal titles within the same 
group in Part II, the additional citations were not added to the total. I also did not 
differentiate between majority opinions, dissents or concurrences, nor did I account 
for a negative or critical citation of an article. Essentially, if my searches indicated a 
reference to an academic legal periodical anywhere in an opinion, it was added to 
my total.  
I also did not account for differences in page numbers per volume for the different 
journal titles, which provides an advantage to more voluminous or more regularly 
published journals as they produce more material that could potentially be cited by 
a court.139 Other scholars have attempted to account for this advantage by 
 
and not ("entrepen. bus. l.j.") and not ("davis bus. l.j.") and not ("vand. l.j.") and not ("u.p.r. bus. l.j.") 
and not ("rico bus. l.j.") and not ("nevada l.j.") and not ("chi. l.j.") and not ("kentucky l.j.") and not 
("mary's l.j.") and not ("marys l.j.") and not ("ohio l.j.") and not ("nev. l.j.") and not ("denver l.j.") and 
not ("brandeis l.j.") and not ("basin l.j.") and not ("hall l.j.") and not ("thomas l.j.") and not ("hamline 
l.j.") and not ("willamette l.j.") and not ("rock l.j.") and not ("ualr l.j.") and not ("washburn l.j.") and 
not ("wash. l.j.") and not ("u. ark. l.j.") and not ("hasting l.j.") and not ("tulsa l.j.") and not ("wyoming 
l.j.") and not ("blackletter l.j.") and not ("coastal l.j.") and not ("wyo. l.j.") and not ("nova l.j.") and not 
("denv. l.j.") and not ("den. l.j.") and not ("louis l.j.") and not ("howard l.j.") and not ("how. l.j.") and 
not ("cam. l.j.") and not ("camden l.j.") and not ("u.a.l.r. l.j.") and not ("marshall l.j.") and not ("state 
l.j.") and not ("u. l.j.") and not ("univ. l.j.") and not ("det. l.j.") and not ("envtl. l.j.") and not ("envt. l.j.") 
and not ("env. l.j.") and not ("st. l.j.") and not ("const. l.j.") and not ("world l.j.") and not ("admin l.j. 
am.") and not ("pac. l.j.") and not ("pacific l.j.") and not ("sci. l.j.") and not ("l.j. sci.") and not ("y.l.j.") 
and not ("md. l.j.") and not ("int'l l.j.") and not ("intl. l.j.") and not ("international l.j.") and not 
("interest l.j.") and not ("int. l.j.") and not ("hofstra lab. l.j.") and not ("comp. lab. l.j.") and not ("educ. 
l.j.") and not ("prop. l.j.") and not ("can.-u.s. l.j.") and not ("ent. l.j.") and not ("entertainment l.j.") and 
not ("conn. ins. l.j.") and not ("elder l.j.") and not ("fed. comm. l.j.") and not ("urb. l.j.") and not 
("urban l.j.") and not ("women's l.j.") and not ("rights l.j.") and not ("rts. l.j.") and not ("rits. l.j.") and 
not ("immigr. l.j.") and not ("immigration l.j.") and not ("gaming l.j.") and not ("emp. l.j.") and not 
("empl. l.j.") and not ("bus. com. l.j.") and not ("tax l.j.") and not ("sports l.j.") and not ("mar. l.j.") and 
not ("maritime l.j.") and not ("con. l.j.") and not ("black l.j.") and not ("dev. l.j.") and not ("resol. l.j.") 
and not ("quinnipiac health l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac prob. l.j.") and not ("quinnipiac probate l.j.") 
and not ("hofstra labor l.j.") and not ("conn. prob. l.j.") and not ("detroit l.j.") and not ("conn. probate 
l.j.") and not ("interdisc. l.j."). 
138 Some academic legal periodicals used such common names they had to be excluded from my 
results, for example, a search for the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform's previous title, 
Prospectus, returns over 5,000 opinions unrelated to the journal. 
139 See Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 227, 240–
41 (1976) ("Other things being equal, a journal with more citable material may be expected to be 
cited more often than one with less citable material."). 
measuring citations per article,140 citations per page,141 and even citations per 
word.142 Given, however, that my study looked at judicial citations to all academic 
law journals as well as citations to groupings of law reviews rather than particular 
volumes or years, these options were not practical, nor would they have added 
measurably to my analysis.143  
 
 
140 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 389, 392 (2000). 
141 Leonard, supra note 90, at 193–94. 
142 Perry, supra note 73, at 10. 
143 Id. at 10–11 ("Total citations are the best measure of the overall influence of each journal . . . The 
journal that publishes more text is more valuable in the sense that it contributes more to the legal 
discourse . . . As long as impact per se is a valid measure of quality (in the aggregate sense), citation 
frequency is a legitimate ranking criterion. On the other hand, using standardized citation rates 
(such as citations per x words, or even citations per article) better reflects average academic 
quality."). 
